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ABSTRACT
Understanding environmental threats posed as a byproduct of technology has become an
important role for our federal governmental agencies. This study examined environmental
hazard assessment in theory and in practice.
Discussion established the unique nature of environmental hazard assessment as
compared to financial or natural hazard assessment. This first section examined advan-
tages and shortcomings of four methods to judge the tolerability of environmental hazards:
Natural Baselines, Risk/Cost/Benefit Analysis, Revealed Preferences, and Expressed Pref-
erences. The differences in perspectives between expert risk assessors and the lay public
was highlighted.
For the case of ocean incineration of liquid hazardous wastes the dilemma faced by
agencies in selecting an assessment process was shown to be partially resolved by agency
reaction to interest groups. Several agencies were involved in the assessment process
including: the Air Force, the Maritime Administration, three separate branches of the
Environmental Protection Agency, and the Congressional Office of Technology Assess-
ment. Eight agency hazard assessment reports authored by these agencies were reviewed.
A correlation was established between interest groups and hazard perspectives. The bal-
ance struck between expert and public hazard perspectives for each of the reports was
determined. The major legal, bureaucratic, factual, and political factors influencing the
balancing process was observed. The changes in the balance over time was shown to cor-
relate with chanb~s in the relative strength of interest groups.
Two additional findings are noted. First, in a real world case example the public
placed considerable weight on the role of management in forming its hazard determination
- 11 -
for a technology. Second, there was a direct correlation between an agency's distance from
the management of a technology and the quality of the balancing done by the agency - as
defined by placing weight on both hazard perspectives.
- 111 -
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
Hazard assessment is the "process by which society informs itself about threats to humans
and what they value",l There are many types of hazards which society assesses in order
to mitigate their effects. In recent years, society has attempted to identify and control the
negative side effects of technology affecting environmental quality. Hazard assessment for
environmental protection has become an important role for the federal government.
Environmental hazard assessment of specific activities or technologies are performed
by and for federal agencies according to a variety of legal and political triggers to deter-
mine the overall tolerability of the activity and identify areas where threats can be mini-
mized. For example, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 2 requires
that an assessment be made of all major federal actions with the potential to create signif-
icant impact on the environment. Regulatory programs may require an assessment of
hazards. An agency has considerable discretionary powers to assess risks within their
general agency mission.
There are several ways to perform an environmental hazard assessment. Substan-
tively, assessments can be differentiated by two parameters which have an effect on the
outcome of the assessment. First, the hazard's scope - the breadth of the causes and
effects to be evaluated - has an effect on the assessment. Second, selecting among four
methods of judging the tolerability of a hazard partially affects the outcome. These meth-
Hohenemser, Christoph Roger E. Kasperson and Robert W. Kates, Causal Structure,
1985
2 U.S. Congress, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 42 USC §§4321 et.seq.,
1969
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ods include: Natural Baselines, Risk/Cost/Benefit Analysis, Revealed Preferences, and
Expressed Preferences.
Given that various methods produce results of varying acceptability - agencies are
confronted with a dilemma - which method should they select? If one method were clearly
preferable as tested by standard academic criteria the answer would be easy. This is not,
however, the case. Alternately, agencies can select a method and scope based upon who
likes it. Each of the methods and changes in scope can be roughly associated with a con-
stituency. In broad terms which will be expanded upon later, the public is in favor of the
methods and scope which account for social factors. Technicians, risk experts, prefer the
methods and scope which can be quantified, tested and reproduced.
This paper will examine the resolution of this dilemma for a specific technology -
ocean incineration of hazardous wastes. This technology has been the subject of consider-
able controversy between the experts and the public. Implicit in this discussion on policy is
the validity of both of these perspectives. 3 Agencies have balanced expert and public risk
concerns in individual reports and over the entire course of U.S. involvement with ocean
incineration. During this period the balance made between expert and public risk percep-
tion has shifted in the hazard assessment reports made by agencies. This paper will doc-
ument the shift in the balance from reports which emphasize expert opinion to those which
place more weight on public risk evaluation. Central to this discussion of the balancing of
perspectives will be the investigation of how federal agencies incorporate social values into
the hazard assessment. It will be demonstrated that the agency risk balancing process is
influenced by the strength of political constituencies.
The investigation of this central thesis provides a framework for discussing several
important questions in "real world" environmental hazard assessment, including: What
specific discretionary powers are employed by agencies which allow them to respond to
3 Green, Harold P., The Role of Law In Determining Acceptability of Risk, 1980
pp.255-267
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shifts in the relative political strength constituency groups? What are the methodological
differences used in the assessment of hazards and which constituencies do they favor? Is
it possible to perform an environmental hazard assessment in an asocial manner? Is it
advisable to do so?
This paper is outlined as follows. Chapter 2 deals with hazard assessment methods.
It establishes the need for and the specific nature of hazard assessments for environmental
polifi:y. The differences, shortcomings, potential constituencies and use of an assessment's
scope and method of tolerability judgement will be examined outside the context of a spe-
cific case. The sufficiency of the four methods of tolerability judgement • Natural Base-
lines, Risk/Cost Benefit Analysis, Revealed Preferences and Expressed Preferences . will
be measured using a list of criteria important to any academic study. It will be shown
that no single method matches all of the criteria.
The third chapter describes the rationale and procedure for the case study. Ocean
incineration as a treatment method for hazardous waste will be introduced. The steps
necessary to prove the thesis that Agency assessments of ocean incineration were subject
to the influence of constituency groups will be listed and the method for proving each
explained.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 evaluate the balancing of public and expert risk reports prepared
during three temporal phases of the overall societal mood toward ocean incineration: the
viable option phase, the public opposition phase and the balanced hazard phase, respec-
tively. For each of these periods several discrete agency hazard assessments will be eval-
uated. For each of the reports the balancing of public and expert risk perception will be
discussed. At the end of each chapter the individual reports will be ranked against one
another for incorporation of public and expert opinion. A fourth phase which has no reports
- the withdrawal of ocean incineration from the U.S. market will be explained in Chapter
6.
- 3 -
Chapter 7 concludes by reviewing the evidence for each step in the proof of the
hypothesis. Some implications of the current nature of Agency environmental hazard
assessment, as revealed in the ocean incineration case, will be outlined.
- 4 -
Chapter II
THE NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARD ASSESSMENT
Risk assessment has recently become a widely used term in the field of environmental poli-
cy. Basically, risk assessment relates to understanding environmental threats so that
proper corrective measures can be taken. A more thorough understanding of the term and
related terms is important, however, to fully grasp the policy implications associated with
the assessment and management of environmental impacts.
Hazard assessment is the "process by which society informs itself about threats
humans and what they value".4 Risk is the quantified measure of that threat expressed
as conditional probabilities of experiencing harm. 5 Risk assessment is the process of
quantifying hazards to better understand them and facilitate decisions on the tolerability of
the threat. Quantified risk assessment is a somewhat redundant term both with respect to
itself and and with respect to risk assessment. Quantified risk assessment has come to be
distinguished from risk assessment, however, by generally referring to predictive computer
techniques which model threat, or a single aspect of that threat, such as probability of a
hazardous occurrence or likelihood of exposure using numeric experimental data.
This paper is concerned with assessment within the most general realm - hazards.
Hazard management is the process by which society decides what to do about threats and
takes measures to control or mitigate them. 6 The management of any hazard requires
shifts in resource allocations. Hazard management is therefore generally agreed to raise
4 Hohenemser, Christoph, Robert W. Kates and Paul Slovic, A Causal Taxonomy, 1985
5 ibid.
6 Kasperson, Roger E., et.al., Hazard Management, 1985
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questions of equity, because different groups of people profit depending upon what man-
agement option is selected. Depending on the type of threat, the management/equity
issues are often resolved through governmental or political means.
The Hazard Spectrum
Humans have always faced various threats to themselves and what they value, and con-
sequently hazard assessment has a long history. The insurance industry, which began in
Roman times,7 is based upon estimating the likelihood of property damage, a type of haz-
ard, incurred through business transactions. Firms have developed methods to estimate
the size and probability of a loss to mitigate or prevent these losses. Today the manage-
ment of private financial risk, through insurance, has a well established methodology. 8
Society's concern with natural hazards has an even longer history. Societies them-
selves have developed by being aware of and controlling natural threats. Examples of
societal response to known natural hazards include: structures to hold back flood waters
or preserve water in drought, medicine to combat disease, agriculture to control pests.
Where societies have not been able to comprehend and control hazards they have devel-
oped institutions, both religious and scientific, in an attempt to explain hazards or make
them more tolerable.
Technological hazard assessment and management is new. Technological hazards
have been described as "man-made hazards to man":9 his health, well being, societal
institutions, and his surroundings. Prior to World War II, technology which created sub-
stantial risk to third parties, either human or the environment, did not exist on a signifi-
cant scale. ' 0 Today the list of such technologies is long, and growing rapidly, including:
7 Berkely, Edmund C., Probability and Statistics, 1961
8 See generally, Long, Matthew, Jr., Risk Management Manual, Vol. 1, 1984
9 Cooper, M.G., Risk: Man-made Hazards to Man, 1985
1 0 Perrow, Charles, Normal Accidents, 1984 ,also Commoner, Barry, The Closing Cir-
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nuclear power, super tankers, organic chemical manufacture, genetic engineering, and the
specific topic of concern ocean incineration.
There is some evidence that technological hazards have existed as far back as Roman
times. 1 1 Early examples, include: the exposure of the wine drinking public to lead from
ceramic glazes, and black lung disease to coal miners. These examples, however, differ
from modern technological hazards in one or more of the following aspects:
• the extent or cause of the damage was unknown at the time of exposure.
• occupational exposure was the primary means of contact. 1 2
• the capacity for large scale third party impact did not exist. ' 3
• the technological hazards were overshadowed by the unconquered natural hazards.
This list demonstrates the irony of modern technological hazards. To some extent society
has become aware of these hazards because of the positive aspects of technology. Society
has the technology to measure and be aware of the hazards which were previously unnot-
iced. Technology has conquered many natural hazards which previously overshadowed
technological hazards.
Environmental hazards are the particular technological hazards of concern here.
Environmental threats of technology have come to be associated with negative physical
impacts to humans, biota or their surroundings. I 4 Technological impacts which are not
cle, 1971
" Kranzberg, Melvin, Development of the Concept of Technology Assessment, 1969 .
See also, Nriagu, Jerome, Lead and Lead Poisoning in Antiqu~ty, 1983
, 2 Starr argued that occupational exposure has been dealt with within the traditional
market model by higher wages paid to exposed populations. See Starr, Chauncey,
Social Benefit versus Technological Risk: What Is Our Society Willing to Pay For
Safety?, 1969
1 3 Perrow, Charles. Normal Accidents, 1984
, 4 U.S. Congress, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 42 USC §§4321 et.seq.,
1969 as interpreted in Metropolitan Edison Co. vs. People Against Nuclear Energy
(103 S.Ct. 1556 1983) where the court refused to acknowledge the potential psycho-
logical damage from the restart of the Three Mile Island reactor as an environmental
impact because there was no physical effect. .
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considered environmental include: changes in social institutions, redistribution of wealth,
and changes in social welfare, unless there is some identifiable physical effect. The threat
of television induced violence is not, for example, thought of as environmental hazard.
These non-physical impacts are excluded because they require a different and less rigorous
methodology for measurement of impacts. ' 5
Management of Hazard Types
The assessment and management of environmental hazards is fundamentally different
from the assessment and management of either private financial hazards or natural haz-
ards. The attributes of environmental hazard management will be discussed in relation to
the management of the more familiar hazards.
The differences between financial and environmental hazard management are several.
The cost of environmental damages is external to the financing structure of the free mar-
ket entrepreneur, so-called externalities. The individuals and environment exposed to
modern technological risks often cannot select whether or not to be exposed. Consequently,
the management of these risks is necessarily socio-political rather than strictly economic.
Moreover, the quantification of environmental hazard is more complex than the assess-
ment of private financial hazard. The identification of victims is difficult. 1 6 The prob-
ability factor for large scale catastrophic accidents is difficult to assess because of the lack
of historical precedent. 1 7 The costs cannot always be adequately measured or compen-
sated in monetary terms. 1 8
1 5 See generally; Graham, Julie and Roger E. Kasperson, Television a Social Hazard,
1979 , p.427
1 6 Schneider, Keith, The Data Gap, 1985
, 7 Perrow, Charles, Normal Accidents, 1984
, 8 While it is acknowledged that some economists do measure social cost in monetary
terms, the method is not universally accepted. See generally, Shrader-Frechette,
K.S., Science Policy, Ethics, and Economic Methodology, 1985
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Environmental hazard management is, however, similar to financial hazard manage-
ment in one crucial element. We, as a society, have the ability to avoid these threats - if
we can adequately understand the social costlbenefit tradeoffs. This is not always the case
with natural hazards, the management of which is also distinct from technological envi-
ronmental risks.
Many natural hazards have complex, unknown or uncontrollable causes. This is also
true of many environmental hazards. Indeed for many impacts, such as declining forest
productivity or elevated cancer rates, it is difficult to tell whether the cause is natural,
technological, or both, let alone determine the exact cause. The uncertainty over cause
reduces society's ability to control these hazards.
Environmental hazards are also similar to natural hazards in that their cause is
external to the individual. This external causal factor has been used to explain the driving
force behind western man's attempts to conquer nature. Our civilization has advanced in
large measure based upon the degree to which we have succeeded. But technological haz-
ards, while external to individuals, are not external to collective mankind. This has led to
a quandary. The elimination of risks which have been created as a by-product of the pro-
duction of goods involves questions of equity. The equitable distribution of goods and risks
through the control of the private sector is political. The management of technological
hazards including environmental hazards has, therefore, become the responsibility of our
political system. The federal government has been particularly involved given the com-
plexity and pervasiveness of these hazards.
The federal government, or any hazard assessor, needs to do three things before
managing hazards.
1. Define the threat
2. Gather data on the threat to change hazard to risk
- 9 -
3. Weigh the threat so that a judgement on how and whether to control it can be
made.
Each of these steps requires decisions which have ramification on the ultimate tolerability
of the threat. Many of the decisions must be made on political rather than purely scientific
grounds.
Note that my statements which remove environmental risk assessment from the field
of "pure science" are controversial. The National Research Council (NRC) defines risk
assessment as "the use of a factual database to define the health effects of exposure of
individuals or populations to hazardous materials or situations". 1 9 This definition, by
concentrating on "factual information" appears apolitical. But this technical process is
subject to value judgements. For example, the hazards examined have been narrowed
from "threats to humans and what they value" to "health effects". Changes in scope of
this sort have political ramifications. Further analysis of the three steps of the technical
assessment process will be used to substantiate the political nature of environmental haz·
ard assessment.
Defining the Threat
The causes of hazards can be analyzed and quantified at several levels. The most specific
causes are the events immediately preceding a negative impact. The broadest causes are
the human needs which, when fulfilled, create hazardous situations as a side effect.
Coates describes this phenomenon as the higher and lower ordered consequences of haz-
ards. 20 Hohonemser et.al. have diagrammed this "causal structure" to describe the var-
ious levels at which hazard assessments can be performed (see Figure 1).
1 9 National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing
the process, 1983 , p.3
20 Coates, Vary T., Development of the Concept of Technology Assessment, 1975
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Figure 1: Causal Structure of Hazards and Various Analysis Modes.
The causes of technological hazards can be examined at several
levels . some more direct to the event than others. Changing the
focus of the hazard analysis affects the types of information gath-
ered. Some of the analyses are shown. The management options
differ widely with the causal level.
Source: Christoph Hohonemser et.al. op.cit., p.40.
The scope of a hazard assessment depends upon the causal level at which the assess-
ment is performed and the number of consequences examined. Negative impacts from
technologies occur because: there is a human need or desire to fulfill that need in a certain
general manner, the selection of a technology, an initiating an event, an outcome and an
exposure. An assessment of the hazard can be performed at any of these levels. More-
over, an assessment can focus on one negative consequence or a number of negative con-
sequences.
Broad assessments are concerned with human wants or needs. There is full account·
ing of threats, whether or not they are quantifiable. These assessments lead to manage-
- 11 -
ment options which are far-reaching and aimed at changing those wants or needs. They
are largely qualitative. Much work in this area tends to argue for controlled technology
and conservation. Kates has named the bias of practitioners of overly broad risk assess-
ments as the "tip of the iceberg" approach. 2 1 These individuals sometimes believe that
for every known hazard there are several unknown or unknowable ones.
Narrower risk assessments tend to be more quantitative. Results are expressed in
comparable reproducible units. Narrow scope hazard assessments try to answer very
precisely the probability of a negative impact. These assessments try to determine future
risk based upon a known negative effect. Narrow assessment tends to focus on human
health and ecological risks as opposed to more intangible, subjective and unquantifiable
threats. Human health risk assessments, in particular cancer based assessments, are
currently the most widely used assessments for environmental policy decisions.
During the past decade the body which has exercised the greatest influence
over risk assessment practice within EPA has been the Cancer Assessment
Group of the Office of Research and Development. 2 2
Several related criticisms have been levelled against practitioners of overly narrow
hazard assessment. Narrowing the scope limits the management options. 2 3 A narrow
focus also tacitly condones the causal structure above the assessment level which has cre-
ated the hazardous situation. Kates labels these individuals "body counters", those who
only believe a hazardous situation exists when human mortality statistics prove it.2 4
2 1 Kates, Robert W., Hazard Assessment Art Science, and Ideology, 1985
22 Yosie, Terry, EPA's Risk Assessment Culture, 1987 ,p.529. See also U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Risk Assessment and Management: Framework for Deci-
sion Making, 1984 , and generally, the series of articles in Science, April 17, 1987,
Vol 236, No.4799.
23 Hohenemser, Christoph Roger E. Kasperson and Robert W. Kates, Causal Structure,
1985
24 Kates, Robert W., Hazard Assessment Art Science, and Ideology, 1985
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Gathering Data
Once the threat has been defined, an assessor must gather data on the probability and
magnitude of the consequence. Three types of data seem to be particularly important.
1. Where human health is the primary consequence of concern, mortality data often
serves as an indicator of the total health threat.
2. Concern over general environmental degradation leads researchers to collect
information on pollutant concentration levels or, less frequently, ecological infor-
mation on species health or diversity.
3. Concern for protecting social values, whatever they may be, leads to the collection
of data on public perception of hazards.
The manner in which data are collected depends upon the nature of the environmental
hazard. For existing threats, of which society has become aware only after the technology
is implemented, much of the work will be gathering historic information or control data
outside of the influence of the technology to compare with data on the impacts of the tech-
nology. For proposed technologies, the data gathering stage involves more predictive
methods, usually based on similar technologies. Gathering this sort of information allows
the hazard to be classified as a risk.
The importance of risk classification is perhaps best made clear by a simple analogy
to physics. Heat is a real phenomena, but without degrees and a temperature scale our
means to understand and control heat is limited. Similarly, while hazards are a real phe-
nomena, classification of risk allows for the establishment of a social tolerability scale for
the purpose of hazard management.
Risks are then prioritized on a scale so that their tolerability can be determined. The
scale links the assessment and management of hazard. The judgement of hazard toler-
ability concerns the assessment insofar as the risk value of the assessed hazard affects the
tolerability. The judgement of tolerability is also part of the management process. Should
a control or mitigation measure be instituted or '.1ot?
- 13 -
Four techniques and associated scales have been proposed to judge the tolerability of
environmental hazards.2 5
1. Natural Baselines
2. Risk Cost Benefit Analysis (RCBA)
3. Revealed Preferences
4. Expressed Preferences
The selection of a particular tolerability scale has a substantive effect on the favoring or
disfavoring particular interests.
A brief discussion of the procedure for each method will follow. The following criteria
will be used to illustrate the differences between the methods.
• applicability to all threats
• quantification which allows for comparisons among hazards
• reproducible results
• sound explicit assumptions
• result provide useful information for risk management decisions.
These criteria are intended to show the relative strengths and weaknesses of each method.
Natural Baselines
Natural Baselines describe environmental conditions which are present naturally, without
man's influence or at least without the influence of a specific disturbing factor. These
conditions may be expressed chemically, as a concentration of a possible contaminant,
and/or biologically, as measured either as individual or ecosystem health and diversity.
Human health data may also be used as a baseline. Baseline data are compared with data
after a disturbing element has been introduced to measure the impact of that element.
Often several sets of baseline data are taken to more fully understand the processes at
25 As listed in Shrader-Frechette, KS., Risk Analysis And Scientific Method: Methodo-
logical and Ethical Problems with Evaluating Societal Hazards, 1985 , pp.3-15
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work.
Risks are judged as intolerable using this method when a proposed hazard generator is
believed to cause an unacceptable impact, as measured by a shift from the natural base-
lines. 2. 6 This belief may be founded on actoal or projected impacts. Effects may be pro-
jected based on anticipated contamination output and known effects of contaminant levels.
Natural Baselines are useful for risk management. They have been widely used in
the development of environmental pollution standards. 2 7 Once a cause and effect has
been determined for a contaminant level it can be reproduced and applied to other situ-
ations. Natural Baselines are applicable to a wide range of environmental impacts.
This method does not explicitly apply social values to the judgement of tolerability
which may be considered as both a strength and a weakness. It is a strength insofar as it
simplifies the description of a risk, making standards easier to develop. Social factors are,
however, important in a full assessment of threats to humans and what they value. 2 8
A major, unavoidable difficulty in the use of Natural Baselines for judging the toler-
ability of environmental hazards lies in the complexity of cause and effect pollution rela-
tionships. There are two general ways around this problem, both of which weaken Base-
line type studies. First, assumptions and extrapolations can be made to standardize
information to make it more applicable to a wider range of situations. These assumptions
and extrapolations introduce accuracy problems. 2 9 Second, baselines can be developed for
specific hazard generators and impact data can be gathered until an impact occurs. In this
case resources are spent on research which could have gone to hazard investigation if a
26 Holdgate, M.W., A Perspective of Environmental Pollution, 1979
27 Lippman, Morton and Richard B. Schlesinger, Contamination Criteria and Exposure
Limits, 1979 ,pp.270·310
28 Shrader-Frechette, K.S., Risk Analysis And Scientific Method: Methodological and
Ethical Problems with Evaluating Societal Hazards, 1985 ,pp 3-15
29 Target Exposure, Risk and Holdgate, M.W., A Perspective of Environmental Pollu-
tion, 1979 ,Chapter 6 Establishment of Goals and Standards, pp.140-163
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more forward looking assessment method were chosen. 3 0
Risk Cost Benefit Analysis
Risk Cost Benefit Analysis (RCBA) methodologyJ 1 is well developed having roots in the
management of financial hazards. The process consists of several discrete steps. The
potential damages and benefits for a specific project are enumerated. Monetary values are
assigned to each consequence. The monetary value of a cost or benefit is weighted for
probability of occurrence. This value is then discounted for time; the value of some future
money calculated in present dollar terms. RCBA in public policy strongly resembles RCBA
in private financial management. They are not, however, equivalent. Economists have
invented social cost and social benefit variables to account for values external to traditional
market theory. J 2 Environmental risks are accounted for as the sum of the probable neg-
ative social cost. Actions are judged as tolerable where the total social benefit exceeds
total social cost - a positive net present value. Other models focus on social cost alone as
expressed in terms of potential health effects.
This economics based approach to hazard assessment and management is appealing
because of its elegant simplicity. The costs and benefits are all quantified in the same
unit, money. The results of RCBA from one set of actions, therefore, can be readily com-
pared to those from another set of actions. For example, if we could solve the RCBA
equation for two technologies which dispose of toxic wastes, we could easily determine
which technology would be preferable. Moreover, the monetary end result from RCBA is
meaningful; it can also be used to establish an insurance schedule to pay for losses should
J 0 Burroughs, R.H., OCS Oil and Gas: Relationships between Resource Management and
Environmental Research, 1981
J 1 See generally, Sasson, Peter J. and William Schaeffer, Cost Benefit Analysis - A
Handbook, 1978 , See also Long, Matthew, Jr., Risk Management Manual, Vol. 1,
1984
J 2 Shultze, William D., Ethics, Economics and the Value of Safety, 1980
- 16 -
they occur. 3 3 Finally, RCBA is appealing because it forces the analyst to explicitly enu-
merate potential variables which influence the costlbenefit ratio. Once listed and evaluated
the model permits reproduction of results or experimentation with different combinations of
weights for variables, so-called "sensitivity analysis". The model's flexibility creates a
feeling of control, and a means to incorporate new information.
The limitations of RCBA lie in the simplifying, often implicit, assumptions one must
often make to quantify hazards in dollar terms. This results in practitioners of RCBA
overlooking or improperly measuring hazards which do not fit within the monetary risk
model. The controversial assumptions and simplifications may include: 3 "
• Voluntary and involuntary exposure to risk are equated.
• Human life is given a monetary value. 3 5
• A clean environment is given a monetary value.
• The future is worth less than the present.
• Threats to human dignity or social structures are not measured.
The assumptions necessary to produce results are not universally accepted. Changes in
these assumptions produce considerable variation of results. Further, Risk Cost Benefit
Analysis does not explain the nature of hazards.
Revealed Preferences
Revealed Preferences is a method first introduced by Starr in 1969 explicitly for the pur-
pose of assessing technological hazards. 3 6 The method operates on the premise that soci-
33 Haimes, Yacov Y, Risk Benefit Analysis in a Multiobjective Framework, 1981
3" See generally Perrow, Charles, Normal Accidents, 1984 ,Haimes, Yacov Y, Risk
Benefit Analysis in a Multiobjective Framework, 1981 ,and Shrader-Frechette, KS.,
Science Policy, Ethics, and Economic Methodology, 1985
3 5 Kahn, Shulamit, Economic Estimates of the Value of Life, 1986
36 Starr, Chauncey, Social Benefit versus Technological Risk: What Is Our Society
Willing to Pay For Safety?, 1969
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ety is willing to tolerate levels of risk which are equivalent to the levels which it has toler-
ated in the past - the revealed preference. This preference level is described by plotting
several factors for several hazard producing activities. Hazards are equated with mortali-
ty • either described as the ratio of deaths per individual activity or deaths per time of
exposure. The benefit level which justifies a risk is expressed in dollars. For voluntary
activities the amount of money spent on the activity is equated with its benefit. For invol-
untary activities the contribution of the activity to the persons annual income is equated
with its benefit. The assumptions used to derive this monetary value vary both substan-
tively and qualitatively with the risk generator described. Figure 2 was developed by
Starr. J 7
This plot was used to generate the following principles:
L "The public is willing to accept voluntary risks roughly 1000 times greater than
involuntary risks." (Note the distance between functions separating voluntary
and involuntary activities.)
2. "The statistical risk of death from disease appears to be a psychological yardstick
for establishing the acceptability of other risks." (Note that activity above the
average "Pf", or probability of fatality, line viewed as voluntary.)
3. "The acceptability of risk appears to be crudely proportional to the third power of
its benefits." (Note slope of voluntary/involuntary curves R"'BJ .)
These results are meaningful because they can be applied to proposed activities.
In general, Starr's work is noteworthy because it is creative and thought provoking.
Following the publication of his 1969 paper, the number of academics interested in quanti-
tative risk assessment increased substantially. The concept of a revealed preference has
an intuitive appeal to risk managers who wish to manage risks for the overall social good.
Comparisons can be made among several risks. Moreover, the revealed preference method
sets out to explain the nature of societal response to risk.
J 7 Starr, Chauncey, Social Benefit versus Technological Risk: What Is Our Society
Willing to Pay For Safety?, 1969
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Figure 2:
400 eoo 1200 1600 2000 2400
AVERAGE ANNUAL BENEFIT/PERSON INVOLVED (DOlL.ARS)
Revealed Risk Preference. Risk (R) plotted against benefit (B)
for various kinds of voluntary and involuntary exposure to haz-
ardous activity. The 11 data points were used to substantiate
general principles. The crudeness of the data . both in terms of
number of points and the actual placement of activities on this
fatality/dollar benefit plane has been the subject of subsequent
research.
Source: Chauncy Starr, op.cit. p.1234
The method's assumptions though largely explicit are, however, controversial. A
basic assumption is that society's tolerance to risk is static; past societal behavior is
acceptable under present circumstances. The method cannot, therefore, deal with funda-
mentally different hazards. Perrow argues that the catastrophic potential of some new
technologies, notably nuclear power and weapons, is fundamentally different. 3 8 Some of
the specific assumptions which are used to associate a mo~etary value with societal benefit
3 8 Perrow, Charles, Normal Accidents, 1984
39 Shrader-Frechette, KS., Risk Analysis And Scientific Method: Methodological and
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or risk also circumspect. 3 9 These give rise to data points which may not be correct. 4 0
The importance of correct data points is particularly important given the broad generali·
zations which are drawn from sometimes scant data. Researchers have found that the
simple mathematical relationships proposed by Starr are not bourne out by repeat experi-
ments.4 1
A final problem with the revealed preferences method is that the number and type of
hazards and hazardous activities to which the method may be applied is circumscribed by
the availability of data on historical risks. Occupational exposure to disease is fairly
traceable through records. Data on non-occupational exposure to life threatening hazards
is inadequate. Historical data on nonfatal human hazards and threats to what humans
value - clean environment and social institutions, is extremely scanty. Even if one could
find a present day means to determine an historical relationship between hazardous expo-
sure and damages the relevance to risk assessment would be questionable. Modern day
discoveries would not provide evidence of a conscious social decision that a level of risk was
preferable; there would be no revealed preference.
Expressed Preferences
Expressed preferences surveys individuals to determine tolerable risk levels. Because the
method relies on opinion it is also referred to as perceived risk analysis. Expressed prefer-
ences attempts to measure threats to humans and what they value in a broader and more
direct sense than the other risk tolerability methods. The generalized approach is to ask
people what they feel is risky and why. Specific research is not, however, quite that
Ethical Problems with Evaluating Societal Hazards, 1985 ,p.??
4 0 See general critical discussion of revealed preferences in Chapter 18 of McCormick,
Norman J., Reliability and Risk Analysis, 1981 pp.367-374
4 1 Otway, H.J. and J.J. Cohen, Revealed Preferences: Comments on the Starr Risk
Benefit Relationships, 1975 and Fischhoff, Baruch, Paul Slovic and Sarah Litchen·
stein, Weighing the Risks, 1979
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broad. For example, Slavic, Fischhoff and Lichenstein in their work asked participants "to
consider the risk of dying (across all U.S. society as a whole) as a consequence of this
activity or technology." This "perceived risk of dying" measure, while broader than risk
based on mortality figures, is less broad than the researchers stated purpose to examine
"threats to humans and what they value". Non-mortal health threats and threats to the
quality of life are still not directly addressed.
Which risks are perceived as the greatest varies tremendously between lay persons
and experts.' 2 Expert evaluation of the risk closely resembles the historic mortality data.
Public perception of risk is more complex, involving a subtle weighing of several hazard
characteristics, including the extent to which the risks are known to science and the likeli-
hood of fatality of the activity.' 3 Mathematical methods have been used to group the
individual characteristics, allowing for a simplified description of the perceived risk. The
two overriding factors which contribute to lay persons perception of risk are Dread risk and
Unknown risk. (See Figure 3)
"Dread risks" are those which combine the following risk characteristics: globally
catastrophic, uncontrollable, not easily reduced, involuntary, not equitable, have fatal con-
sequences, risk increasing and pass a high risk to future generations. "Unknown risks"
are: not observable, unknown to those exposed, effect delayed, new, and unknown to sci-
ence. These two factors correlate directly with the magnitude of overall risk expressed by
lay persons.
Expressed preferences strength lies in its insight into the social complexity of risk.
Lay persons do not use mortality statistics as a yardstick for the "risk of dying". Lay
persons are most frightened of activities where the consequences surrounding the hazard-
ous event are unknown or dread. Notably, the public worries much more about the worst
'2 Slovic, Paul, Baruch Fischoff and Sarah Litehenstein, Rating the Risks: The Structure
of Expert and Lay Perceptions, 1982
'3 Nine for some studies latter expanded to 18.
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Figure 3: Perceived Risk. Hazard locations on Factors 1 and 2, "Dread"
and "Unknown" risks. The diagram beneath the figure illustrates
the characteristics that comprise the two factors. From Slovic,
Paul, Baruch Fischhoff, and Sarah Litchenstein, Characterizing
Perceived Risk, 1985
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case possibilities than do experts.
Expressed preferences weaknesses lie in the validity of survey techniques. Surveys
may not adequately capture public opinion because of the wording of the questionnaire, the
manner in which it was delivered, or the sampling method. Respondents may not be ade-
quately informed on the issue and is therefore incapable of forming a reasoned answer.
In conclusion, none of the methods currently proposed for judging the tolerability of
environmental hazards is clearly preferable from an academic standpoint. None fulfill all
of the criteria. None are bias free. None totally resolve the problem of comparing low
probability high risk events with chronic risks. None totally explains the nature of haz-
ards. None accounts well for non-mortal threats to humans. Moreover, they often produce
conflicting results when comparing hazard priorities among methods. Sometimes results
can even conflict using the same method depending on the scope of hazards considered.
The finding that there is no academically perfect method for gathering data on the
tolerability of an environmental hazard, nor of determining a hazards scope, is made more
significant by the previous discussion of environmental hazard assessment generally. We
have made several observations. Environmental hazard management is inherently politi-
cal because it requires the equitable distribution, to society as a whole, of risks which have
been produced as a by-product of the production of goods by a sector of the society. The
process of assessment and management are clearly linked. Assessment methods are
malleable in that they vary in the weight they place on social values and the resultant tol-
erability of the hazard. These considerations demonstrate the difficulty faced by an envi-
ronmental hazard assessors. On the one hand they must inform society about risks in
such a way that various risks can be prioritized. Yet, they must also be aware of equity
concerns by which society evaluates the level of threat.
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Chapter III
PROCEDURE FOR CASE STUDY
TESTING THE BALANCE OF EXPERT AND PUBLIC OPINION
In this chapter we shall move from the domain of hazard assessment approaches to the
case study of ocean incineration of hazardous waste. The case study is necessary to
examine how hazards are actually assessed. A key question in examining real world
environmental hazard assessments is -- How do federal agencies incorporate social values
into hazard assessments? In other words, how do federal agencies balance public and
expert risk perception? For the case of ocean incineration, it will be shown that the bal-
ance is significantly affected by political pressure from private industry interest groups
and environmental groups.
Ocean incineration of liquid hazardous waste is a good case study to test this balance
for several reasons. Many assessments have been performed by various agencies over a
twelve year period. The volume and temporal span of reports allows for understanding the
effects of factors which influence the balancing process. The case demonstrates particu-
larly well the difference between expert and public opinion. Experts have generally been
in favor of ocean incineration as a means of reducing hazards from noxious chemical
wastes. The public has overlooked the technology's "anti-hazardous" purpose and has
been quite opposed to this technology.
The proof that political pressure influences the agency balance of public and expert
risk perception of ocean incineration requires examination of several topics.
1. A correlation must be established between interest groups and a specific hazard
perspectives:
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a. between the public involved with ocean incineration and the incorpora-
tion of public opinion as described by Expressed Preference research.
b. between industrial interest and the incorporation of expert opinion
2. The factors influencing the balance between public and expert opinion for each
report must be established.
3. A correlation between changes In the balance between public and expert opinion
within the reports and relative strength of interest groups over time must be
established.
4. It must be shown that apparent shifts In the balancing of risk are discretionary
on the Agencies' part and not due to:
a. changes in legislative mandate
b. changes in the facts known about ocean incineration
The significance and method of testing each of these subproofs will be discussed generally
before presenting data from the eight agency reports examined in this study.
Correlations Between Hazard Perspectives and Interest Groups
The discussion of environmental hazard assessment methods has shown us that the public
and risk experts evaluate riskiness from vastly different standpoints. The public places
emphasis on threats to social values regardless of how well they can be quantified as evi-
denced by concern for "dread" and "unknown" risk factors. Risk experts evaluate riski-
ness predominantly based upon projected or predicted mortality figures, and where those
are not available, they place greater importance on the reliable quantification of other risk
factors. For the case of ocean incineration correlations are hypothesized between these
two theoretical risk perspectives and two real world interest groups.
The lay public hazard perspective, as described in expressed preference research, will
be shown to be similar to the hazard perspective of the invohred public and environmental
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public interest groups which represent them. That part of the public involved with ocean
incineration will be shown to incorporate "dread" and "unknown" risk factors into their
hazard determination. Empirical data will also show that the public considers social values
beyond those identified by expressed preference research.
Industrial proponents of the technology, both producers of hazardous waste and incin-
erator ship owners, are hypothesized to have a similar hazard perspective to risk experts.
The basis for this correlation stems from industry's predisposition toward RCBA. Industry
is, as discussed above, accustomed to financial RCBA models for the management of
financial hazards. Industry is also disinclined to account for social values which would
create costs to them. This predisposition against the incorporation of social values also
leads industry toward evaluation based on the Natural Baselines method which purpose-
fully tries to avoid social factors. The types of data gathered for these tolerability methods
are highly quantified, and mortality data is often preferred.
Another way to describe the tendency of industry to use methods similar to expert
risk assessors lies in their common desire to make the assessment process asocial - to stop
or separate the hazard assessment process before management implications are consid-
ered. Industry's desire to limit social consideration is explained above in light of private
financial considerations. Academic risk experts have another reason for wanting to deva-
lue the importance of social considerations. Traditional academic disciplines attempt to
study phenomenon under controlled conditions to understand basic processes. As such,
simplifying assumptions are often necessary. As shown in the academic discussion on tol-
erability scales, in the field of hazard assessment it is common to simplify the role of social
factors in the evaluation of risk. This is particularly true for the Natural Baselines and
RCBA methods of judging risk tolerability and somewhat true of the Revealed Preferences
method.
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These correlations between ocean incineration interest groups and hazard perspectives
will be substantiated by empirical data from the reports. This is particularly important for
the correlation between industry proponents and expert assessors. While the general
statement can be made that industry always tries to argue in a quantified manner that
downplays the importance of social values, it does not necessarily follow that the risk
numbers, or mortality concentration of pollutants or other information will strongly sup-
port the industry's position. This will, however, be shown to generally be the case for
ocean incineration.
Where the risk numbers found by experts coincide with the interests of industry we
can expect the two positions to be similar. Where the two groups may differ, however, is
on the acceptable quality of quantified risk information. The quality of quantified infor-
mation is a difficult factor to determine. At the onset, the term "reliable quantification"
was used. That term will be expanded in this discussion to include three points.
• The extent of quantification. Nominal data is of less value than ordinal data.
• Relevance to threat. Sometimes quantified information is presented which is of poor
quality because it is not relevant to the perceived threat.
• Backup support. Information which is well substantiated by other work is taken to
be of higher quality than poorly cited data.
In summary, we can expect the following correlations between interest groups and hazard
perspectives. Public perception of the risks of ocean incineration should correlate with
generaJ public perception of hazards as determined by expressed prefere..nce research. The
case study will expand the types of social values considered important in risk perception.
Industrial perception of ocean incineration should correlate with expert risk perception
insofar as both limit the role of social factors and place importance on risk quantification.
These two groups may be differentiated by the quality of acceptable quantified information
as defined.
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Factors Influencing the Balance of the Public and Experts
Determining that the balance struck in hazard assessment reports by agencIes between
expert and public opinion is influenced by the relative strength of interest groups requires
two sub-determinations. First, the balance for each report must be determined. Second,
the legal/bureaucratic factors influencing that balance must be understood. Discussion of
the laws concerning ocean incineration will focus on two issues. First, the role of the
mandatory review processes of NEPA and MPRSA in incorporating public and expert
opinion will be examined. Second, the role played by legislation in defining the scope of
hazards will be discussed.
Two administrative or bureaucratic factors also have a particular role in influencing
the manner in which agencies balance public and expert risk opinion. Quite significant is
the observation that agencies are reactive to public involvement. Agencies do not, for the
most part, try to anticipate public concerns. If the public does not raise concerns they tend
to be overlooked. Finally, the role of an agency's mission and management interest in the
technology in the balancing of public and expert opinion will be highlighted.
Changes in Balance Over time
The balancing of public and expert opinion will be shown to be affected by the overall
"mood" of society towards the technology. This mood, which has evolved over ocean
incineration's 15 year history in the U.S. can be described by four temporal phases.
Though these phases overlap and their endpoints are somewhat indistinct, recognition of
their existence facilitates discussion and analysis. The first three of these phases have
produced hazard assessments and will be used as the organizational focus for the chapters
which follow and present information from the specific assessments. These are defmed as;
1. Viable Option. During the period from 1973 to roughly 1981 ocean incineration
was generally considered a viable option for the disposal of liquid organic hazard-
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ous wastes. During this period several assessments were performed, many tak-
ing the form of Environmental Impact Statements. The Maritime Administration
(MARAD) underwrote a $64 million loan to build two incinerator ships. The
reports analyzed will include three EIS's and one report on the results from a test
burn in the Gulf of Mexico.
2. Public Opposition. From again roughly 1981 to the present considerable public
opposition has been voiced against ocean incineration and several public hearings
have been held in accordance with various regulations. One public hearing report
and one summary of public opinion have been selected for detailed analysis.
3. Reconsideration. From about 1983 to 1987 the federal government re-
evaluated its position on the risks of ocean incineration. Four test burns were
cancelled and regulations were stalled. Two risk assessments were produced as
discretionary informational documents. Both of these will be reviewed.
4. Withdrawal Foreshadowed in November 1985 by the default on the MARAD
loan, 1988 brought a significant point of withdrawal from ocean incineration. In
December 1987, the largest industry proponent of ocean incineration announced it
was no longer interested in the American market. EPA soon followed in January
by shelving its ocean incineration regulatory program. There are no reports from
this period.
The relationship between the balancing process and the reiative strength and interest of
the environmental groups and industry will be discussed for each period.
Discretionary Changes in Balance
To strengthen the proof that the agency risk assessment process for ocean incineration is
influenced by political pressure one should examine alternative reasons for changes in the
balance. First, it will be established that the changes in balance were not the result of
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changes in the law regarding ocean incineration. Second, the known facts about the risks
of ocean incineration will be shown to have remained relatively constant and therefore
would not justify a shift in the balance.
Analyses of these topics will show the agency ocean incineration assessment process
to be influenced by political concerns. The tolerability judgement by the agencies has shift-
ed over the years in response to growing public opposition. This trend will be documented
by reviewing several agency hazard assessments in detail. Specific items to be discussed
for each report include: the nature of the report's legal trigger. the balance struck between
public and expert opinion, discretionary actions taken by the agency which effect the bal·
ance, and the factual and public opinion climate surrounding the assessment process.
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Chapter IV
OCEAN INCINERATION AS A VIABLE OPTION
The first phase of domestic policy toward ocean incineration of hazardous waste took
place in 1973 when ocean incineration became a viable option. Ocean incineration was
technically an option in 1969 when the Dutch first burned waste in the North Sea. The
technical viability is based on incineration which reputedly reduces 99.99% of liquid toxic
organic compounds to: hydrochloric acid, carbon dioxide and water. The only harmful con-
stituent of these three dominate by-products is the acid which would deposited on, and
neutralized by, sea water. Harmful, much less concentrated byproducts, may include:
heavy metals, unburned waste and Products of Incomplete Combustion (PICs). This engi-
neering option was virtually unnoticed in the United States until 1972 because much of the
waste which would be a candidate for incineration was legally dumped directly into the
sea.
In that year the legal picture changed. The MPRSA 4 4 was passed and ocean dump-
ing was prohibited without a federal permit to be given only when human health and the
marine environment were not affected. 4 5 Regulations promulgated in 1973 prohibited or
phased out virtually all ocean dumping of liquid organic chemical waste. 4 6 Less environ-
mentally damaging disposal methods needed to be sought. Therefore, the once economi-
cally prohibitive method of incineration became more attractive. Shell Chemical, which
had once dumped waste at sea, was the first to express an interest in ocean incineration.
44 Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 33 U.S.C. 1401 et. seq.
October 23, 1972; P.L. 92-532; 86 Stat. 1052.
45 33 U.S.C. § § 1412 and 1414
4 6 40 C.F.R. § 220 et. seq.
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This initial phase can be characterized by four activities. The Air Force's use of ocean
incineration to burn the stocks of the herbicide Agent Orange.' 7 EPA's involvement with
Shell Chemical to burn liquid organochloride wastes in the Gulf of Mexico.' 8 The Mari-
time Administration's decision to underwrite loans for the construction of incineration ves-
sels.' 9 EPA's designation of a site in the Gulf of Mexico for ocean incineration. 5 0 Each
of these actions will be discussed separately. The purpose is to examine how the adminis-
trative, legal, factual and political settings affect the process of hazard assessment, espe-
cially the balancing of public and expert opinion.
The discussion will begin by describing the requirements for hazard assessment con-
tained within the National Environmental Policy Act. The Environmental Impact State-
ments (EIS) produced by Air Force, MARAD and the EPA are the principal public risk
assessment documents during this period.
EIS as Hazard Assessment
Many hazard assessments performed by the federal government take the form of an envi-
ronmental impact statement. NEPA required all major federal actions with significant
potential impact on the environment must be evaluated prior to deciding to go through with
them. 5 1 The differences between hazard assessment methods described in Chapter 2 and
EIS's are, however, notable.
47 U.S. Air Force, Final Environmental Impact Statement. Disposition of Agent Orange
Herbicide by Incineration, 1974
4 8 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water and Hazardous Material, Dis-
posal of Organochlorine Wastes by Incineration at Sea, 1975
4 9 U.S. Maritime Administration, Final Environmental Impact Statement. Maritime
Administration Chemical Waste Incineration Ship Project, 1977
5 0 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water and Hazardous Materials,
Final Environmental Impact Statement of Designation of a Site in the Gulf of Mexico
for Incineration of Chemical Wastes, 1976
5 1 § I02(2)(c) NEPA and amended CEQ guidelines from Aug.l, 1973 and EO 11514
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The scope of an EIS is limited by a judicial affirmation to a proposed project. They
must not be so narrow as to consider only one piece of a larger project· so called segmen-
tation.5 2 Neither must they be so broad as to affect policy programs. 5 3 The scope of.
assessment therefore is often an assessment of a technological choice. At this level the
agency must list a series of alternatives to the plan and enumerate the impact of each and
why they have not been selected. 5 4 Accordingly, Agencies are not inclined to look at
whether to go forward with a proposal, but rather how.
NEPA does not explicitly require the use of a particular method to judge the tolerabil-
ity of hazard. The law requires that certain information be gathered to identify potential
hazards but not that those hazards be systematically compared. 5 5 The agency retains
more power if it does not make open tolerability statements because openness invites criti-
cal discussion. This often results in a catalog of related risk information without much
tolerability analysis.
Congress recognized the importance of public and expert opinion to hazard assessment
by incorporating certain review mechanisms into the EIS process. An agency is required
to prepare a draft EIS, circulate it, respond to comments and hold hearings. 5 6 The subs-
tantive effect of the review process varies because agencies are given considerable f1exibil-
ity on the decisions reached following the EIS process. If taken to court, the judge exam-
52 In Wisconsin Environmental Decade v. State (94 Wis.2d 263, 288 N.W. 2d 168 (Ct.
App. 1979) the standards for project segmentation and separability were set. The
specific ruling held that a project, a sewer system interceptor could be considered
independent of line extension of the sewer system.
53 Kleppe v. Sierra Club (427 U.S. 390 1976) held that Agencies did not have to prepare
a broad EIS for entire programs· here a regional coal leasing program - but only spe-
cific projects.
54 40 C.F.R. § 1506
55 For discussion of substantive requirements of NEPA see Anderson, Frederick,R. Dan-
iel R. Mandelker, and A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Protection: Law and Policy,
1984 pp.752-754
56 40 U.S.C.S. §4332 notes 56-59
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ines only whether the final decision made by the agency was "arbitrary" or
"capricious".S7
Two early environmental impact statements performed by agencies whose primary
mission is not environmental·· the Air Force and MARAD. These will be compared with
two early EPA reports· the Shell burn report and the EIS for the Gulf of Mexico site des-
ignation.
Air Force EIS
The Air Force performed an EIS for ocean incineration in connection with its effort to
destroy stockpiles of Agent Orange. 5 8 The chemical, a defoliant, was used by the Air
Force during the Vietnam war. In April 1970, the herbicide's use was suspended because
of evidence that exposure leads to tissue damage and birth defects. A year later, the
Department of Defense assigned the Air Force the responsibility of disposing the remain-
ing stocks. A total of 2.3 million gallons, 1.4 million stored at Johnston Island and
860,000 gallons stored at Gulfport, Mississippi of drummed material were to be destroyed.
Concurrent with drafting an impact statement the Air Force decided to refer the
Agent Orange problem to their Scientific Advisory Board (AF SAB).5 9 The ad hoc com-
mittee was to provide a review mechanism for the EIS which was internal and yet
removed from the direct management of the problem. This discretionary review mecha-
nism serves two purposes - technical advice and friendly criticism.
57 See generally, "Chapter VII, The National Environmental Policy Act Section D. Ade-
quacy" in Anderson, Frederick,R, Daniel R. Mandelker, and A. Dan Tarlock, Environ-
mental Protection: Law and Policy, 1984 ,pp.752-788.
58 U.S. Air Force, Final Environmental Impact Statement. Disposition of Agent Orange
Herbicide by Incineration, 1974
59 U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report of the Air Force Scientific Advisory
Board ad hoc Committee on the Disposition of Agent Orange, 1974
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The committee's technical advice was particularly useful for this problem which lay
outside the Agency's expertise. The AF SAB described and evaluated the alternatives for
Agent Orange disposal including several means of biological/chemical degradation, inciner·
ation and sale or donation to a foreign country. Evaluation was performed using modified
Risk/Cost Benefit Analysis. The treatment and liability cost for each alternative· was
weighed against the effectiveness of the destruction technique. Effectiveness was meas-
ured by speed, completeness and reliability of destruction. Risks peculiar to a technology,
such as extensive handling, were also mentioned. The SAB concluded that incineration,
the third most expensive technology out of seven alternatives was preferred.
The Board made eight recommendations on the Draft EIS.
1. evaluate the worst case of emissions release
2. include data from prior burns
3. characterize the hydrochloric acid plume
4. take precautions to avoid damaging reef if incineration or drum cleaning is per-
formed at Johnston Island
.5. all stores should be destroyed together
6. evaluate the catastrophic risk potential
7. unnecessary considerations should be deleted
8. perform a full-scale test burn
These concerns address both public risk perception, such as catastrophic risk, and
expert concerns, including better characterization of emissions. Each of these concerns
was responded to in the Final EIS.
The scope of the Final EIS is quite impressive beyond these responses. It is broad
enough to encompass the full range of potential impacts including: transportation, drum
cleaning, building and demolition of a treatment facility. The public health risk posed by
unburned Agent Orange was described. Moreover, the risks from the incineration process
itself were extensively quantified including: probable content and dispersion of stack emis-
sions, fugitive emissions and a worst case scenario.
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The broad yet quantified approach seems to have pleased both expert and public risk
assessors. Judging by the responses to the Draft EIS included in the report a general
consensus appears in support of ocean incineration. Note also that the circumstances sur-
rounding the Agent Orange burn were about as good as they could get in favor of ocean
incineration. There was a consensus to destroy the waste. The proposal was to burn a
large uniform stockpile of material, therefore, the incineration process would be simpler
and destruction efficiency known with more accuracy than for a complex waste stream.
Moreover, consenting to burn the stockpile could not be construed as a consent for a large
program; it was a one shot deal. The proposal was by the government and not by indus-
try. Private firms are sometimes viewed with more skepticism because the profit motive
conflicts with concern for the public health and the environment. Finally, the proposed
incineration location was remote, in the central Pacific Ocean. There was not therefor~ a
vocal local constituency opposed to the burn.
The agreement to burn Agent Orange, and the subsequent successful burn, further
established ocean incineration as a viable option for the disposal of liquid organic hazard-
ous wastes. As evidence that ocean incineration was considered a viable option we look to
the Maritime Administration's actions.
MARAD EIS
MARAD was approached by At-Sea Incineration for a low cost guaranteed loan of $64
million under Title XI Merchant Marine Act of 1970. 6 0 The federal government's under-
writing or financial backing of this significant environmental activity was viewed as an
action meriting review under NEPA.
60 U.S. Maritime Administration, Final Environmental Impact Statement. Maritime
Administration Chemical Waste Incineration Ship Project, 1977 p.I·3
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MARAD's review mechanism is more typical of most EIS's in that it did not utilize an
ad hoc review committee. The corresponding FEIS reflects less concern with public or
expert opinion. The MARAD scope of impacts included: the construction or conversion of
incinerator vessels, their operation, maintenance and scrapping. Though this scope
appears complete for the identification of potential hazards, the detailed analysis places
certain caveats or restrictions on the scope which precludes full enumeration of hazards.
The omitted hazard factors include: infrastructure, upset conditions, and discussion of
broad alternatives to destructive technologies. These three issue are typical of the types of
public concerns raised later in the ocean incineration debate and are discussed more fully
in Chapter 5.
Infrastructure. This EIS did not consider the environmental impacts of the infrastruc-
ture necessary to support ocean incineration vessels. Incinerator vessels would require
storage capacity for hazardous material near port. Any new facility for the storage for
ultimate treatment of hazardous wastes is viewed as unnacceptable by local residents.
This is particularly true where the wastes are not locally generated, and hence the area is
not enjoying the economic benefits of the waste generating industry. Moreover, recent
studies have concluded that fugitive emissions during storage, loading and tank cleaning
would be great enough to warrant construction of a new facility dedicated to offshore
incineration despite its attendant environmental impacts. 6 1 ,6 2
Upset Conditions. The scope of hazard impacts considered is weighted towards
"normal operation" of the incinerator ship. The EIS relies heavily on the EPA's data of
Shell's first test burn, including the EPA's entire report as a second volume of the FEIS.
The quality of the information within this report has been contested and will be discussed
6 1 Marcus, Henry S., Incinerator Ships: the Difficulty in Optimizing the System Versus
Optimizing the Vessel Design, 1984
6 2 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Ocean Incineration: Its Role in
Managing Hazardous Waste, 1986 ,p.110 discusses the option proposed by Seaburn
Inc. to utilize intermodal tanks, the contents of which would only be mixed on-board to
avoid land based fugitive emissions.
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more fully below. Another demonstration of MARAD's emphasis on normal operation is
lack of a worst case scenario for spills.
Alternatives. The alternatives to ocean incineration of hazardous wastes are also indi-
cative of a limited scope which tends to advance the project. Alternatives considered
include: physical, chemical, thermal or biological treatment, "ultimate" disposal (direct,
theoretically contained, release into the environment) or no project. Discussion of these
alternatives assumes that the waste will continue to be generated.
Limiting the number of hazards considered works in favor of the proposal while not
addressing public concerns. The causal level at which the EIS performed, the selection of a
technology, precludes the discussion of more fundamental questions. An advantage of a
more limited scope, as has been pointed out in the theoretical discussion, is that it allows
for greater quantification.
The MARAD EIS is, however, far 'less quantified than the Air Force EIS. The doc-
ument is very descriptive and thorough in the enumeration of hazards but no attempt is
made to even place an ordinal value on the various risk factors. It is strange, for example,
that the discussion of the environmental impacts from mining the metal to build the ship is
given more space than the impacts from potentially harmful constituents dispersed at sea.
These were covered with unsupported statements like "The Chemical Waste Incinerator
Ship project will have a beneficial impact on the long term productivity of the sea."6 J
MARAD's quantified discussion of alternative technologies was limited. Seeming to
follow the methodology of RCBA, MARAD listed the cost of the other thermal technologies,
but not the physical or chemical technologies. Ten separate cost units were used, some of
which were incomparable. 6 4 Furthermore, no effort was made to quantify social cost or
social benefit. The EPA commented on the problem of various monetary units. MARAD
6 3 U.S. Maritime Administration, Final Environmental Impact Statement. Maritime
Administration Chemical Waste Incineration Ship Project, 1977 p. VU-1
64 Specifically including: $/MT/day, $l1b/hr, $/kg/hr, $/liter, $/ton dry solids, $lton liquid,
$/gallon, $/hr/unit, cents/kg, $/hourly capacity
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responded by noting that the numbers were developed by the EPA.
The National Science Foundation commented on the lack of quantification of risk fac-
tors in the MARAD EIS suggesting the use of a probability matrix and the use of cost
benefit information to clarify the effect of a serious spill. 6 5 The FEIS disregarded these
concerns.
MARAD concurs with the possible utility of such data if it can reasonably
be developed, but has concluded that development of such information is
beyond the scope of this environmental impact statement. 6 6
This response demonstrates substantive limitations of NEPA's procedural review require-
ments to incorporate outside opinion. Agencies have the discretionary option not to incor-
porate comments based upon their internal evaluation of the comment. Where the volume
and agressiveness of comments is low the agency can afford to not respond to some com-
ments.
Comments to the draft impact statement and the responses to them, such as this, are
indicative of the agency's balance of expert and public opinion. They also document the
level of concern outside the agency. In this specific report, the EPA's comments were the
most extensive.
Among the other respondents one sees minimal interest from the coastal states- four
responding on single page no comment forms. Two, Maryland and Oregon, briefly men-
tioning a single concern, port loading effects and the potential impact of burning waste
other than organochlorides, respectively. California, responding late, mentioned concern
for the cumulative chronic impact of ocean incineration on the marine environment. Note
that none of the Gulf states off whose coast the first load had been burned raised any
objection.
6 5 U.S. Maritime Administration, Final Environmental Impact Statement. Maritime
Administration Chemical Waste Incineration Ship Project, 1977 IX-53
66 U.S. Maritime Administration, Final Environmental Impact Statement. Maritime
Administration Chemical Waste Incineration Ship Project, 1977 IX-55
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Also silent was the environmental community. Comments were solicited from the
Environmental Defense Fund, Resources of the Future and the Water Pollution Control
Federation. The National Wildlife Federation which had taken an active role in the deci·
sion to regulate ocean incineration under the MPRSA was not, however, notified. Neither
were the national groups with a particular concern for the marine environment. Indeed,
only comments received from a non-governmental source were from the American Eagle
Foundation. This group which repeatedly refers to itself as a "national environmental
organization" is an anomaly. Its position is that of unabashed support for the ocean incin-
eration business. MARAD, in the list of comment solicitations, separated the Foundation
from the traditional environmental groups. The group seems to have no independent
political or environmental life outside of the ocean incineration issue. Their comments are
noteworthy, however, to point out that in the beginning the "environmental" voice con-
cerning ocean incineration was soft or positive.
In summary, the public or expert perception of risks from ocean incineration were not
well addressed in the EIS, but neither were they raised by many respondents.
Shell Chemical Burn
Roughly concurrent with the MARAD and Air Force involvement with ocean incineration
the EPA was beginning its extensive and multi-faceted involvement with ocean incinera-
tion. The Agency's role began on a reactive, not a pro-active basis. In 1974, Shell Chem-
ical requested to burn 16,000 MT of mixed liquid organochloride wastes in the Gulf of
Mexico. 6 7 Prior to this point the EPA did not have any plans to use ocean incineration as
part of a hazardous waste management strategy. 6 8 Indeed, EPA's initial response to
67 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water and Hazardous Material, Dis-
posal of Organochlorine Wastes by Incineration at Sea, 1975
68 See generally, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Hazardous Waste Division of
the Office of Solid Waste, Incineration in Hazardous Waste Management, 1975
Ocean incineration is only given cursory mention in the introduction of this report.
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Shell was that they had no jurisdiction over ocean incineration. This action prompted the
National Wildlife Federation to raise a formal objection with the EPA. The Federation
maintained that ocean incineration constituted ocean dumping and therefore required a
permit. EPA consented. 6 9
The EPA chose to allow the Shell burn, and subsequent applications, under their
research and interim ocean dumping permit regulations,7 0 This gave EPA the opportuni-
ty to gather data on the incineration process without regulations specific to ocean incinera-
tion. It also allowed commercial sized burns. It bears repeating that this was a reactive
approach to risk assessment and management. The Agency allowed burning before deter-
mining the risk. An assessment of the technology could have been performed using data
from the North Sea experience where the Vulcanus and other vessels had been operating
for six years as the Air Force, and to a lesser extent MARAD, did in their EIS. Alterna-
tively, the Agency could have interpreted the research permit regulations more strictly -
only allowing small burns where "the scientific merit of the project outweighs the potential
environmental or other damage that may result from such dumping",7 ,
EPA's first published ocean incineration hazard assessment comprises the results
from the Shell first test burn. The format and contents of this assessment varies marked-
Iy from the EISs previously examined. The differences stem largely from differing legal
trigger and accordant review processes. The Disposal of Organochlorine Wastes by lnciner-
ation at Sea is not an EIS. It was prepared on a discretionary basis as a justification of
the EPA's decision to grant a research permit. Because of the peculiar nature of this trig-
69 § 101(a) of the Act bars the unpermitted "transportation from the United States" of
"any... material for the purpose of dumping it into ocean waters," and §3(f) defines
dumping to mean "a disposition of material." as argued in a letter from Congressman
Dingell to the EPA and cited in Kamlet, K.S., Ocean Disposal of Organochlorine
Wastes by At-Sea Incineration, 1981 p.299
70 40 CFR §220.3(e)
7 1 For general discussion see, Bakalian, Allen, Regulation and Control of United States
Ocean Dumping: A Decade of Promise, An Appraisal for the Future, 1984
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ger the report more closely resembles a lab report than a policy hazard assessment.
The assessment's scope is limited to the effects of incinerator emissions of organo-
chloride wastes under normal operating procedures. Specifically, hazards were limited to
emissions monitored during non-upset conditions: hydrochloric acid and residual unburned
waste or Principle Organic Hazardous Constituents (POHCs). The impacts are further
limited to the two specific burns at the Gulf of Mexico.
The potential for negative impacts due to changes in pH and chlorinity, and the depo-
sition of organchlorides and trace metal levels is identified and discounted as negligible. 7 2
A quantified description or weighing of the risks is therefore unnecessary. This "no risk"
conclusion, while valid for this set of results is overly optimistic for judging the technology
as a whole. This report ignores the potential cumulative impacts, accompanying infras-
tructure, fugative emissions or catastrophic risk potential of routine ocean incineration.
Moreover, the validity of the monitoring methods has been subject of much criticism.
The criticism has been raised not as part of the review process, as with the EISs exam-
ined, but rather raised outside the report'? 3 This detached criticism is due to a lack of
formalized review procedures for the assessment of the test burn. The EPA itself admitted
problems with the monitoring methods of the first test burn. 7 4 The Agency did not, how-
ever, allow these concerns to preclude the burning of a second "test" shipload of wastes of
approximately 4,200 metric tons.
EPA's reliance on information provided by the permittee also brings into question the
merit of the report. While it is recognized that industry often supplies information to
agencies, including during the EIS process, this report is more explicitly guided by industry
7 2 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water and Hazardous Material, Dis-
posal of Organochlorine Wastes by Incineration at Sea, 1975 ,pp. 59-74
7 3 Kamlet, KS., Ocean Disposal of Organochlorine Wastes by At-Sea Incineration, 1981
and U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Ocean Incineration: Its Role in
Managing Hazardous Waste, 1986
7 4 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water and Hazardous Material, Dis-
posal of Organochlorine Wastes by Incineration at Sea, 1975 pp.2,39,48
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input than are the other reports reviewed. Shell Chemical provided the laboratory analy-
sis and conclusions for several aspects of the report. 7 5 For example, a Shell scientist was
the only reference used in the determination that ocean incineration would have no effect
on migratory birds. 7 6 While this does not necessarily mean that the conclusions were
incorrect it does raise a conflict of interest question. Shell's opinion cannot be as trusted as
an external risk expert.
Questions of administrative procedure are also raised by the function of this report. It
was prepared to determine whether Shell could burn their wastes in an environmentally
sound manner. Half of the waste, 8400 metric tonnes, was burned in the process of mak-
ing that decision! Moreover, this report, in the absence of other broader hazard assess-
ments performed by the Agency, served to sanction the technology. MARAD appended the
entire 225 page volume to its EIS to supply the background evidence that ocean incinera-
tion was not harmful. Until supplemented by the Environmental Impact Statement desig-
nating the Gulf of Mexico Site for incineration two years later in 1976 this report was the
functional equivalent of a general hazard assessment.
Gulf of Mexico Site Designation EIS
The EPA prepared an EIS for the designation of an incineration site in the Gulf of Mexico.
It differs from the other EIS reports for three legallbureaucratic reasons. The report was
prepared voluntarily by the agency. It was prepared by the lead regulatory agency for
incineration. The assessment utilizes pre-existing risk guidelines - those developed for
direct ocean dumping.
7 5 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water and Hazardous Material, Dis-
posal of Organochlorine Wastes by Incineration at Sea, 1975 pp.62,66,69,74,74.
7 6 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water and Hazardous Material, Dis-
posal of Organochlorine Wastes by Incineration at Sea, 1975 p. 74
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EPA did not feel that the EIS was legally required because of the court's ruling on
functional equivalence of regulatory programs. 7 7 The court decided that where a specific
regulatory program serves the same purpose as an EIS that an EIS did not need to be
performed. In this case, EPA felt that the ocean dumping regulations under the MPRSA
were "functionally equilavent" to NEPA's requirement for an EIS. NEPA was designed
primarily to get agencies to consider the potential negative impacts of all projects. The
ocean dumping program was designed to consider and lessen environmental impacts from
potential pollutants released at sea. The Agency performed the EIS anyway to satisfy
public concerns.
Site designation was an important step for the development of a routine ocean incin-
eration program. To comply with the MPRSA, EPA had to designate sites based upon the
generalized ocean dumping criteria and develop specific regulations for incineration. The
procedural assessment process for this report cannot, therefore, be separated from the
overall regulatory program.
EPA's Use ot' Criteria in Hazard Assessment.
EPA used three similar sets of ocean dumping risk criteria to deterimine the acceptability
of the proposed site - "general criteria", "specific criteria", and "impact categories". (See
Appendix B for full listing.) Each of these sets of criteria came from the proposed ocean
dumping regulations which were adopted in January 1977 after the publication of the
EIS,7 8
The "general criteria" for site selection relate to the scope and tolerability scales.
They establish types of risks which are to be evaluated. The risks considered by the
"general criteria" are economic and to a lesser degree biological.
7 7 Maryland vs. Train (1976 DC Md) 4/5 F Supp.116
78 40 CFR 228; 33 USC § 1412· 1418; 42 FR 2482 January 11, 1977 except as noted .
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Locations and boundaries of disposal sites will be so chosen that temporary
perturbations in the water quality or other environmental conditions caused
by disposal operations affecting mixing zones anywhere within the site can
be expected to be reduced to normal ambient seawater levels or to undetecta-
ble contaminant concentration or effects before reaching any beach, shore-
line, marine sanctuary, or known geographically limited fishery or shell
fishery.7 9
The use of the term "normal ambient seawater levels" would indicate the primary method
for judging tolerability would be the Natural Baseline method. Note that there is no direct
mention of public risk concerns in these general criteria.
The "specific factors" for site selection provide an opportunity for public risk concerns
to be raised. Note that two of these factors (4&5) relate to the assessment of the manage-
ment of the technology, specifically - the types and quantities of waste and packing, the
feasibility of monitoring and surveillance. These "specific criteria" address the public con-
cern for control of technology and some of the infrastructure concerns. Some of the public
concerns not addressed include: onland transportation and loading problems, extent of
knowledge of specific site and worst case scenario. Nonetheless, when looking at the spe-
ciflC criteria deference seems to be made to public and expert risk concerns.
The "impact categories"8o supercede the public concerns for risks mentioned In the
"specific criteria". The impact categories are the operative criteria - they are the ones
upon which EPA will decide whether ocean incineration is acceptable or not. The EPA
proposed to "maintain or increase existing rates of disposal" unless or until the conditions
of Impact Category One are met. 8 1 These conditions can be summarized as: 8 2
• The accumulation of waste near a beach or sanctuary.
7 9 40 CFR 228.5(b); as cited in U.S. EPA op. cit
80 40 CFR 228.10
8 1 40 CFR 228.11 as cited ibid. p. 23. Note that the call here to "maintain or increase"
disposal rates represented the extant regulatory scheme which was dropped in revi-
sions of 1978. 43 FR 1071, January 6, 1978.
8 2 For full text see Appendix B
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• Impact on the population of valuable commercial or recreational species or species
essential to the propagation of such species.
• Impairment of the taste or odor of above species.
• Toxic concentration present outside disposal site more than four hours after disposal.
These impact categories places emphasis on economic factors, and to a lesser degree,
potential health effects to humans or the marine environment. Note that effects on biota
which are not essential to the support of commercially valuable species are not considered.
The use of three separate, overlapping lists of ocean incineration criteria which com-
prise different issues and risks makes it difficult to determine what factors are actually
important to EPA. The Agency appears to be balancing a wide range of concerns but on
closer examination the important criteria are largely economic. This is, however, only part
of the framework for the actual decision. Examination of the EIS itself also demonstrates
the extent to which public and expert opinion is considered.
The differences between this EIS and previous assessments would seem to encourage
the incorporation of more public opinion in the report. This voluntary report is the first
assessment prepared by the lead regulatory agency which examines the impact of a pro-
posed routine incineration program. This EIS is, therefore, an appropriate medium for the
agency to discuss and dispel public fears of the technology.
Public concerns were addressed more fully in this report to the extent that the
description of the marine environment was more complete. The majority of the assess-
ment comprises a descriptive geography of the site's chemistry, physical properties and
biology. Notably, this is the first report to discuss the role of the surface microlayer .- the
top millimeter skin of the ocean important in ocean/air gas exchange which may be a criti-
cal habitat, for supporting the plankton community and potentially could accumulate pollu-
tants, particularily toxic metals, to a degree which would disrupt plankton life with wider
consequences to the entire marine ecosystem. The scientific community has acknowledged
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this risk but agreement has not yet been reached on the importance of the surface micro-
layer, nor the potential impact from ocean incineration. 83 Many advocate further
research. EPA, however, substantively dismisses the impact of ocean incineration on the
surface microlayer.8 4
Two new issues were raised by industry: regional acid rain and stratospheric ozone.
These concerns were incorporated at the written request of Shell Oil Company, in an
unsolicited comment on the draft environmental impact statement. While these issues are
potentially problematic for alternative waste disposal technologies, they are not issues for
ocean incineration. It is significant to this study on the balance of perspectives, however,
that the EPA responded to these two issues within the text of the FEIS. It demonstrates
how the agency acts in a reactive capacity to the shaping of hazard concerns. The agency
did not independently raise the ozone or acid rain issue in the alternatives section, but
waited for an outside interest to do so.
Compared with the other assessments made during this period, the site designation is
broader on the issues addressed but less broad on the alternatives considered. The major
decision was between sites, not between technologies. The NEPA "no action" requirement
was intended to force consideration of other technologies. The only other alternative dis-
cussed, however, was direct ocean dumping -- and that was discussed only on one page.
EPA's fulfillment of the no action requirement here does not answer the general public
concern that the least environmentally damaging method for waste disposal has been
selected.
8 J U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Scientific Advisory Board, Report on the
Incineration of Liquid Hazardous Wastes, 1985 ,pp.32-33
84 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water and Hazardous Materials,
Final Environmental Impact Statement of Designation of a Site in the Gulf of Mexico
for Incineration of Chemical Wastes, 1976 , p. 58
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In general, beyond raising and dismissing the issue of the surface microlayer, the EPA
continued to overlook several public concerns. The Agency relies heavily on information
-from the Shell burn report and the MARAD environmental impact statement instead of
widening the scope of concerns. The Shell burn report, again used in its entirety as an
appendix, is used to substantiate the minimal impact of normally operating ocean inciner-
ation.85 MARAD's report is deferred to on matters concerning the probability and effect
of a severe spill. 8 6 The major public concerns that continued to go unaddressed include:
infrastucture impacts, upset conditions during burning, spills serious consideration of
alternative technologies, and effects from burning complex wastes dissimilar from the Shell
wastes.
From the perspective of expert risk assessors this EIS has merits, particularly if one
is an advocate of the natural baseline method. The descriptive geography of the report
establishes a baseline to compare with post incineration conditions. The theoretical prob-
lem of which baseline to select is, however, apparent in this study. For example, in dis-
cussing the improbable impact due to acid rain from ocean incineration activities the report
refers to "naturally occuring acidic sulfur (SOx) and nitrogen (NOx) as well as chloride in
salt spray". The first two of these pollutants are largely anthropogenic. The selection of
acid rain as the baseline also seems to indicate social acceptance of the condition - which is
not true.
Beyond the controversy over the use of natural baselines, this report is better sub-
stantiated than the Shell Burn Report. A wide variety of sources external to EPA and the
generators of the hazardous waste are tapped for information. Of particular note is the
better cited discussion of the possible impact of ocean incineration on migratory birds.
8 5 Appendix G, under separate cover U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of
Water and Hazardous Materials, Final Environmental Impact Statement of Designa-
tion of a Site in the Gulf of Mexico for Incineration of Chemical Wastes, 1976
86 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water and Hazardous Materials,
Final Environmental Impact Statement of Designation of a Site in the Gulf of Mexico
for Incineration of Chemical Wastes, 1976 p.74a
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Twelve articles were used to substantiate that the site is an unlikely migratory route as
opposed to the single citation supplied by Shell Chemical in the earlier report. 8 7
Summary of Viable Option Period
To summarize the first phase of ocean incineration development one can look at the start-
ing players. The generators and owners of liquid hazardous waste both public and private
were the initial proponents of ocean incineration. The federal government responded in a
reactive manner to their suggestions. State governments and the public seemed unaware
that the strong legislative mandate prohibiting ocean dumping in the MPRSA would lead to
the attractiveness of ocean incineration. They were not actively involved during this initial
phase.
The EPA assessments performed during this period proceeded under the "assumption
that ocean incineration was a viable option for the disposal of liquid organic hazardous
wastes - many of which had proviously been dumped directly at-sea. This assumption is
evidenced by several actions. The agency chose to allow a limited number of commercial
scale burns while gathering information on the impact of incineration. The scope of their
assessments during this period was fragmented - there was no single document that looked
at the potential threat from the public's perspective: from the point of origin to the long-
term effects of burning, including low level chronic effects and the impacts of associated
infrastructure. Tolerability judgments were made mostly on the basis of economics, modi-
fled informal RCBA, and natural baselines. The overall methods used during this period
therefore were more appealing to expert rather than lay assessors, though notably prob-
lems were raised on the professionalism of some methods by outsiders. The empirical cor-
relation between expert assessment of ocean incineration's risks and industrial proponents
interests was established.
87 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water and Hazardous Material, Dis-
posal of Organochlorine Wastes by Incineration at Sea, 1975 p.65
- 49 -
EPA's slant toward industry and expert hazard assessment can be explained by the
lack of involvement of "the public" during this initial period. The comment that agencies
can act in a reactive fashion is even more true of the public which is in turn reactive to
government actions. Until lay persons become directly aware of potentially dangerous
activities "in their own backyard" they did not act. During this initial phase there were no
well organized local or regional anti-ocean incineration groups. The National Wildlife Fed-
eration was the only true environmental organization to take up the cause. 8 8
The differences among the assessments during the viable option period stem largely
from differences in the nature of the trigger. At the beginning of this chapter, two triggers
were given· NEPA and the ocean dumping regulations. Upon closer examination it
becomes important to be more specific because discretionary actions in the procedure and
the influence of related requirements effect the outcome of the assessment.
The three EISs are differentiated as follows. At its discretion the Air Force EIS was
performed using a Scientific Advisory Board thus changing the internal review process.
EPA's EIS for the Gulf of Mexico site designation was discretionary under NEPA but
closely tied to the procedural and substantive requirements of the ocean dumping regula-
tions. MARAD's EIS was an impact statement made on a specific project without an
internal review process.
Ranking Public Concerns
Ranking these assessments for the incorporation of public risk concerns does not involve a
simple quantifiable scale. However, one can make general conclusions. The Agent Orange
EIS was better at incorporating public concerns than the Gulf of Mexico EIS. It had a
8 8 One might argue that Ken Kamlet of the Federation commented on ocean incineration
from a different perspective than a lay person and could not be considered as their
representative. Kamlet's perspective was more shaped by awareness of alternatives
than the general public's. This is substantiated by the fact that the Federation, after
receiving objections from its membership, changed its position to one more critical of
ocean incineration. (Sally Lentz, Staff Attorney for the Oceanic Society, personal
communication.)
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broader scope - specifically it considered worst case scenarios, infrastructure problems,
several substantively different alternatives and acknowledged difficulties in knowing risks
precisely. The Air Force's Scientific Advisory Board played a role in pointing out these
concerns.
The Gulf of Mexico EIS did not address public concerns well. It measured risks based
upon wide ranging criteria which were developed for ocean dumping generally. The use of
these criteria, was biased toward economic concerns despite acknowledging the importance
of non-mortal threats to humans and their values. This EIS was an opportunity for the
lead management agency to understand and allay where possible, public opposition to the
technology at an early stage. Instead, the Agency addressed those issues which were
raised by the parties most directly involved at this stage - industry proponents.
MARAD's EIS was notably bad at incorporating risks which are important to the lay
public. MARAD overemphasized the environmental impact of building and dismantling the
ship while deferring to EPA on the risks of the incineration process itself. The Shell test
burn report is the document which deals with public fears over ocean incineration most
inadequately. The risks of the technology generally are implied to be the same as the
measurable effects of emissions from a controlled test burn under good operating proce-
dures.
What does this say about the review process and the role of NEPA in performing
assessments which are satisfactory to the public? First, the agencies have considerable of
discretion under NEPA. They can, but do not have to, change the review process to more
fully account for public concerns. They can also focus narrowly on the immediate known
effects of a proposed project. The requirements of NEPA are not sufficient to force agen-
cies to consider "potential perceived hazard" though at least they must nominally respond
to specific concerns raised.
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Variations in the incorporation of social risk factors explains why this series of reports
which varies substantively on the tolerability of ocean incineration. There is a direct cor-
relation between the omission of social factors and the attractiveness of the technology.
The MARAD and Shell Burn reports are the most strongly in favor of ocean incineration.
The Gulf of Mexico report advocates the technology while pointing out a few possible prob-
lem areas. The Air Force report arrives at acceptance of ocean incineration as the best
available alternative only after extensive discussion of the costs and risks associated with
other technologies.
Ranking Expert Concerns
As with lay concerns, the ranking of the incorporation of expert concerns must be infor-
mal. Both the Air Force EIS and the Gulf of Mexico EIS have commendable attributes in
regards to the consideration of expert concerns. These EISs' evaluation of the alternative
disposal methods clearly quantified risks and costs. The site designation EIS contained a
significant amount of baseline information on several variables. The Shell burn report,
while the most technical of the assessments, has received criticism on its methodology and
the validity of its results. s 9 MARAD's methodology once again ranks as the poorest
assessment. The cost figures for incineration methods represent the only systematic
attempt made to quantify risk variables.
Even more than with public concerns, NEPA requirements offer considerable subs-
tantive flexibility for the incorporation of quantifiable "meaningful" assessments. The
review process for NEPA forces agencies to recognize and respond to any public concerns
raised. There is no equivalent regulatory requirement which forces agencies to perform
assessments in a quantifiable manner. As long as the EIS does not reach arbitrary or
capricious conclusions it has the latitude to dismiss the methodological comments and rec-
ommendations of outside experts. MARAD's dismissal of the NSF's request for a prob-
S 9 See note 64
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ability matrix of impacts is a good example of this. 9 0 NEPA's lack of substantive
requirements limits the law's usefulness in forcing decisions to be made in a rational man-
ner considering the potential environmental impacts.
90 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water and Hazardous Materials,
Final Environmental Impact Statement of Designation of a Site in the Gulf of Mexico
for Incineration of Chemical Wastes, 1976 ,p.IX-53 see discussion in text p.38
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Chapter V
PUBLIC OPPOSITION
The assessments reviewed thus far were performed before ocean incineration had become
contested. Neither of the first two Shell Burns, nor the Agent Orange burns met with
broad based public opposition. Public opposition seems to have been ignited in 1981 when
7,000 metric tonnes of PCB laden waste burned in the Gulf after receiving a research per-
mit. In December 1983, an EPA field hearing in Brownsville Texas for another research
permit, turned out more than 6,400 people opposed to another proposed test burn. This
was the largest attendance ever at an EPA field hearing. Since that hearing the anti-
ocean incineration lobby has remained consistently vocal and placed the political viability
of the technology into jeopardy.
It is beyond the scope of this study to determine the exact reason for the dramatic
change in expressed public perception of risks. Key players are as diverse as: the press,
local activists, the national environmental groups, the presidential administration. Subs-
tantively, one might speculate that the public became involved because of fear of burning
PCBs as opposed to chemicals with less well known toxic effects. Or perhaps mistakes
were made in the 1981-1982 burn, or maybe national interest groups took a more involved
position because the EPA was beginning to move forward with a regular permitting pro-
cess. Or fears from Love Canal and other environmental nightmares directed attention
away from optimistic progressive legislative era to protection from improper disposal. Any
or all of these factors may have had a partial effect on the growth in public position.
The EPA has conducted· several public hearings on the issue of ocean incineration
beyond the Brownsville hearing. Two documents from this period will be used to summa-
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rize public opposition, an EPA Hearing Officers Report9 1 and EPA's Office of Policy
Planning and Evaluation's (OPPE) synopsis of public sentiment to incineration of hazard-
ous materials. 9 2 These reports have been selected for analysis because they are compiled
reports of comments and therefore represent public opinion as interpreted by the agency.
Moreover, because they are relatively recent, public opinion is more developed than in ear-
lier hearings. 9 3
A public hearing record can be viewed as a form of hazard assessment which is
markedly different than an EIS or report on a specific burn. A public hearing is a hazard
assessment as it has been defined - the manner in which society informs itself about
threats to humans and what they value. In fact, public hearing records closely resemble
the method of expressed preferences for the determination of risk tolerability; they are
analyses of expressed risk perception of the public.
There are, however, differences. The academic method of expressed preferences
involves a random sample of the population. Public hearings generally turn out those who
already a ware and concerned about an issue. Expressed preferences has been used most
widely to rank a broad range of issues according to several factors. Public hearings focus
on one issue. They do not explicitly enumerate risk factors. Expressed preferences
research has concentrated on hazards which are side effects of a technology. In this case,
the technology's sole purpose is to reduce a hazard - yet the public seems to be even more
afraid of incineration that of the hazardous chemicals to be burned.
9 , U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Hearing Officer's Report on the Tentative
Determination to Issue the Incineration-At-Sea Research Permit, 1986
9 2 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation,
Assessment of Incineration as a Treatment Method for Liquid Organic Hazardous
Wastes: In :) Volumes, 1985
9 3 Public Hearing Officer's reports are hard to obtain. I have made repeated phone
requests to Darryl Brown of EPA's Office of Water, the person responsible for dis-
tributing these reports. These were not responded to despite the fact that according to
the regulations l40 CFR 222.8), copies are to be distributed free to anyone who makes
a specific request. Copy was finally obtained through the Oceanic Society, a private
environmental interest group.
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Public opposition to ocean incineration is a direct reading of risk perception. The term
direct does not, however, imply simplicity. When viewing the record on risk perception
directly through hearing testimony, or through press reports and personal communication,
it is difficult to determine the extent to which media, organizational efforts of particular
individuals or interest groups should be counted in shaping perception. One simply cannot
say, for example, that sixty percent of the population is opposed to ocean incineration due
to catastrophic risk of spillage. Researchers must perceive the perception. I see no way
around this methodological problem, other than to avoid discussion of public opinion, which
is an unacceptable alternative given its tremendous impact on the assessment process.
Test Burn Hearing Report
The test burn hearing officer's report was prepared because section 222.8 of the Ocean
Dumping Regulations requires a summary of public opposition and policy recommendations
based on that opposition. This study will not comment on the policy recommendations
insofar as they deal with management and not assessment. The hearing specifically con-
cerned Chemical Waste Management proposal to burn 708,958 gallons of fuel oil mixture
containing 10-30% PCBs mixture stored in Alabama in the North Atlantic on board the
vessel Vulcanus II. The hearings were held during January 1986 after a tentative deci-
sion by EPA on December 5, 1985 to issue a research permit for the burn.9 4
The represented public for the series of hearings is shown in Table 1. The largest
single identifiable group represents "public interest" or environmental groups. Public
interest groups are different than the general public. They have shown a previous interest
in environmental concerns which may mean that they have more knowledge in the area
and probably means that they are less tolerant of environmental hazards than the general
public. The number of respondents from government agencies demonstrates that when a
large number of people become involved in an issue it behooves them to take a stand.
9 4 50 F.R. 51360, December 16, 1985
. 56 -
Because activists are also voters one would expect the government positions to be swayed
by the the most voluminous arguments. Industry and labor have concerns where hazards
affect their job safety, or the technology may affect their job security. Those affiliated
with professional organizations and academia may by swayed by public concerns or the
offering of expert opinion.
52
# of Letters
1234
18
2
2
24
223
75
2
12
Affiliation of Public Represented during a Test Burn Hearing
Process.
Group
No affiliation
Congress Rep. or Senate
Federal Agencies
Governors
State governmental entities
Local governmental entities
Public interest/Environmental
Industry/Labor
Professional
Academia
Table 1:
Source: U.S. EPA Hearing Officer's Report
The scope of risks brought up in the hearing is broader than for the reports examined
In the previous chapter. Lay persons did not feel confined to discuss only matters con-
cerning the specific research burn in question. Rather, in the public's mind, the hearing
was on ocean incineration as a treatment method for hazardous material generally. Some
of the concerns raised by the public are explainable within the context of research in
expressed preferences and some are not. Lay person concern over unknown or new risks
is reflected by concern over the emphasis on the potential impact to the surface microlayer
and the possible synergistic impact of ocean incineration near the" 106" sludge dumpsite
and that generally not much is known about the oceans. Similarly, concern for dread risk
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is demonstrated by mention of spills, both routine and large, and the use of PCBs as a
candidate for incineration.
An aspect to the character of perceived risk which is readily apparent in a case study,
but is not widely discussed in the academic literature, is the impact of proposed risk man-
agement on the perceived risk. Several of the commenters objections were not directed at
the threat of environmental or public health risk due to the hazardous materials itself but
rather to the lack of sound management. The public did not feel that there was a man-
agement organization in place which could deal with emissions or emergencies. Specific
complaints were raised about: the number of agencies with overlapping jurisdictions, the
lack of training for company and agency personnel, the adequacy of monitoring programs
and the importance of insurance liability and financial solvency of companies.
None of these management issues are considered in traditional academic hazard
assessment because researchers attempt to assess the technology outside the context of
management. The difference between traditional academic and policy hazard assessments
is comparable to laboratory biology vs. field ecology. In the more remote studies research-
ers attempt to control the variables affecting a phenomenon to understand some basic pro-
cess. The limitation of the academic studies is, however, that they can remove fundamen-
tally important factors which 'limit the relevance of their findings.
Realistically, there is a definite relationship between risk management and probable
damage. For example, the impact from a spill is greater is greater if cleanup and control
is not well organized or performed. As established by Starr's work,9 5 acceptance of dam-
age varies with the amount and type of compensation. The likelihood of damage, chronic
or catastrophic is affected by the performance of ongoing monitoring and maintenance
programs. Politically, public concerns can stop or delay projects even if those concerns are
not measurable.
95 Starr, Chauncey, Social Benefit versus Technological Risk: What Is Our Society
Willing to Pay For Safety?, 1969
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Risk minimization was a second theme of the connection between assessment and
management. The public was less willing or unwilling to accept risks where they could be
minimized. In the specific case, the wastes for this burn out of the port of Philadelphia
were to have originated in Alabama. The public felt wastes should be more local to reduce
transportation risks. The public was also concerned about long term risk minimization. It
was argued that acceptance of the PCB research burn would condone a regular ocean
incineration program. Ocean incineration in the longterm was seen as unfavorable insofar
as it did not encourage the more environmentally acceptable alternatives of waste recy-
cling and waste reduction.
Risk distribution was also an important factor in public perception of risk which can
be derived from the Hearing Officer's comments. The public did not feel that it was right to
bear the risks from nQn-regionally generated wastes. Pennslyvanians did not benefit from
the jobs created in producing the materials which created the waste, but withstand the
increased threat. Second, individuals who live particularly close to a facility face a higher
risk than do members of the general public. They are therefore even less tolerant, the
Not-In-My-Backyard syndrome.
In summary, the Hearing Officer's Report represents a totally different type of
assessment than previous reports. It focuses on public risk perception rather than for-
mally modelling hazard potential in an asocial manner. By concentrating on public opinion
the hearing officer's report sheds light on hazard characteristics which are not apparent in
the general research of expressed preferences of technological hazards. Specifically, the
public was concerned with the effect of perceived poor management on the magnitude of
the hazard, especially on regards to emergency response, risk minimization and risk dis-
tribution. These latter two issues also demonstrate the concern the public has for equita-
ble management of risk.
- 59 -
Public Opinion Report by OPPE
In 1984, EPA's Deputy Administrator requested the Agency's Office of Policy, Planning
and Evaluation (OPPE) to prepare a report on hazardous waste incineration. The resul-
tant report, on both land and sea based incineration comprised five volumes, including one
on public concerns.
The scope of the OPPE's 1985 public opinion report is much more detailed and com-
prehensive than the Hearing Officer's Report. OPPE evaluated opposition to 14 land
based incineration proposals and both extant ocean incineration proposals. Hearing
records were reviewed and interviews were conducted with people of note in the hearing or
recommended by EPA Regional Administrators. For ocean incineration 80 interviews were
held.
From the interviews OPPE compiled the public concerns and listed those concerns
from most to least mentioned. This list further demonstrates the complexity of perceived
risks. I have grouped these specific concerns into seven risk types in Table 2.
The first three risk characteristics have been discussed previously. Conventional risks
are defined as those which are accepted as problematic and modelled by risk experts.
Conventional risks include potential public health or economic impacts and the possibility
of hazard releases which are assumed to lead to impacts. Dread or Unknown risks are
defined as per expressed preference research. Next, three types of management related
risk characteristics are mentioned by the interviewers. Specific management concerns, of
which there are several, relate to the specific manner in which the ocean incineration pro-
gram is administered. General management concerns relate to how ocean incineration is
being managed in a broad context. Referring back to Hohonemser's causal structure (Fig-
ure 1) general management risk types address questions at the comprehensive or funda-
mental level. The third management related issue, Minimization and Distribution of risk is
a subcategory of specific management issues, but is worthy of separate mention because -
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RISK
Conventional
Dread
Unknown
Management Specific
Special Geography
Management specific
Unknown/conventional
Conventional
Management specific
Conventional
Conventional
Management general
Special Geography
Minimization/Distribution
SPECIFIC CONCERN
Spills - routine during transportation and handling
Spills - catastrophic
Effects unknown
Perceived poor management of EPA's regulatory
projects
• burns allowed before regulations issued
• regulatory controls inadequate
• liability at sea not clearly established
• monitoring problems at sea
Gulf of Mexico site special
Company credibility
Inadequate technology
Adverse economic impact
Inadequate emergency response capability
Potential environmental effects of air emissions
Unsuitable port site
Lack of national hazardous waste management
strategy
Need to protect oceans as public resource
Importation of outside waste
Table 2: Public Concerns.
Specific Concerns and General Risk Types of the Public Toward Ocean Incinera-
tion - Listed from most to least frequently mentioned. The specific concerns are
taken from OPPE op.cit. Risk types were assigned by the author.
the issue was particularly important in the Hearing Officer's Report and it is distinguished
by the equity questions involved. Finally, a special value is placed on the most threatened
resource. Oceans are singled out as being more geographically valuable than other
unnamed potential disposal areas.
The risk characteristic groupings are useful because they allow for analysis of the
relevance of previous work in the expressed preferences to a real world technology. Con-
versely, they also permit general.ization of specific ocean incineration related risk concerns
into categories of wider applicability. The risk characteristic groupings applied here are
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intended to be taken somewhat loosely, Arguably, one or another risk concern may fall
between two groups, or other categories could be defined. Shifts of this sort, however, are
assumed not to be large enough to invalidate the following observations.
• The OPPE interviewed public is concerned about conventional type risk. Several
types of conventional risks were raised by the public as the most important risk
concern.
• As predicted by expressed preference research, dread and unknown risks play a
major role in the determination of riskiness.
• The management of a technology affects the public's risk assessment.
• Geographically, oceans are an example of areas which are viewed as particularly
threatened.
Agencies can only address public concerns insofar as they know what they are. The
OPPE's listing of public ocean incineration concerns, and the ability to generalize about
perceived risk characteristics from this list, goes a long way to identify important issues
and their relative magnitude.
This report, like the Hearing Officer's Report, does not address expert risk concerns -
but it was not intended to. The full OPPE report addresses expert risk concerns in other
volumes to be discussed in the next chapter in conjunction with other reports also prepared
after public opposition to ocean incineration had been mounted.
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Chapter VI
OCEAN INCINERATION RECONSIDERED
Broad based public opposition to what was once considered a fairly straightforward tech-
nological choice has produced not only a real delay in the implementation of ocean inciner-
ation but also a shift in the assessments done by federal agencies. Balancing expert and
public risk concerns is the dominant theme for the next phase of ocean incineration. Three
reports will be examined from this period. The first, the OPPE report. was introduced
above in connection with its background report on public concerns about incineration. 9 6
Particular attention will be paid to the use of quantified risk assessment within the report.
The second is the EPA's Scientific Advisory Board's (SAB) study.9 7 The third, entitled
"Ocean Incineration as a Treatment Method for Hazardous Waste" was prepared by the
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment. 9 8
OPPE Report
The OPPE report is by far the longest and most detailed study of ocean incineration to
date. It comprises 952 pages, and six volumes, and four major subject areas including;
• Incineration technology
• Market considerations for incineration
96 EPA, Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation, Assessment of Incineration as a
Treatment Method for Liquid OrganicHazardous Wastes:Background Report V: Public
Concerns Regarding Land-Based and OceanBased Incineration., 1985
97 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Scientific Advisory Board, Report on the
Incineration of Liquid Hazardous Wastes, 1985
98 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Ocean Incineration: Its Role In
Managing Hazardous Waste, 1986
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• Comparisons of risks from land based and ocean based incineration
• Public concerns regarding incineration
The report attempts, for the first time, to explore fully incineration technology as a treat·
ment method of hazardous waste. It was published in March 1985, more than 11 years
after the first commercial scale burn in U.S. waters. It is also the first report to incorpo-
rate a quantified risk assessment model into the overall assessment.
Quantified Risk Assessment as Hazard Assessment
The use of a quantified risk assessment model is significant. It is part of a larger move-
ment within EPA to base environmental policy on risk priorities - quantified values of
threats. 9 9 The use of quantified risk information tends to reduce the importance of many
social factors which the public considers during the assessment of a threat. In this specific
case, the threat from ocean incineration is functionally equated to the anticipated increase
of cancer deaths. This risk, cancer mortality, was not even directly mentioned by the pub-
lie in either the Hearing Officer's or OPPE's public opinion reports.
When Ruckelshaus was reappointed to administer the Agency in 1983 he supported
increased use of quantified risk assessment for two main reasons: 1 0 0
• Quantified Risk Assessment allows for comparison and prioritization of hazards.
EPA's need to prioritize became apparent as the number and complexity of environ-
mental statutes and regulations it was responsible for grew. Moreover, the number
of chemicals known and in commerce is phenomenal.
• Quantified Risk Assessment has been recommended as an apolitical method of
assessment. The rationale being that because risk models stop short of making tol-
erability judgement they are apolitical. 1 0 ,
99 Jorling, Thomas C., The Future of Public Waste Disposal, 1986
100 See William Ruckelshaus in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Risk Assess-
ment and Management, 1984
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The inability of risk assessment used for public policy to be apolitical was discussed in
chapter two and need not be repeated. The discussion can be furthered, however, by look-
ing at the specifics of the OPPE's quantified risk assessment for bias.
The quantified risk assessment performed by OPPE attempts to place a numeric value
on the risks from ocean and land based incineration 1 0 2. Two waste streams, Polychlori.
nated biphenyls (PCBs) and Ethylene dichloride (EDC) are selected for the analysis for
several reasons.' 0 3 The cancer and marine toxic and bioaccumulative risk for the com-
pounds was felt by OPPE to be relatively well known. They are typical of wastes to be
burned. They have different dispersion characteristics in the environment. EDC floats
and volatilizes rapidly. PCBs sink, persist and bioaccumulate.
The theoretical end result of the quantified risk assessment model is a number which
represents the summation of all probable impacts due to exposure to ocean incineration.
For this model the impacts considered had three dimensions - the release point for wastes,
the specific type of waste and the type of impact considered. These dimensions were bro-
ken up as follows:
Release Point
• land transportation
• transfer and storage
• ocean transportation
• incineration (including disposal of scrubber water)
Waste Type
• unburned waste
• products of incomplete combustion (PICs)
• Metals
• HydroChloric Acid
Impact
10 1
1 0 2
, 0 3
National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing
the process, 1983
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation,
Assessment of Incineration as a Treatment Method for Liquid Organic Hazardous
Wastes: In 5 Volumes, 1985
EPA, Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation, Assessment of Incineration as a
Treatment Method for Liquid Organic Hazardous Wastes: Summary and Conclu-
sions, 1985 ,p.73
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• Human Health
Acute
Chronic
• Environmental health
acute
chronic
The model does not attempt to fill each cell. Some cells, such as release of PICs at any
point prior to combustion, are irrelevant. Others, such as the chronic or acute impact of
incineration on terrestrial ecosystems were dismissed because of the lack of data. Still
others, such as any releases due to the land transportation component of incineration were
not analyzed because it was assumed that the risks would be comparable between the
technologies.
Given the dismissals or cursory treatment of some impacts, the overwhelming
emphasis of the model lies in a comparison of the increased mortality due to cancer of the
"most exposed individual" (MEl) to chronic stack release as summarized in Table 3.
2.63E-5
3.65E-5
EDC Waste
2.37E-5
3.25E-5
PCB WasteLocation
Land Based System
Texas
Arkansas
Ocean Based -System
Coastline 6.37E-7 1.06E·6
Chickasaw, Alabama 2.02E-8 4.97E·10
Table 3: Summary of Incremental Human Health Risks to Most
Exposed Individual (MEl).
Author's Note: Numbers are expressed in terms of increased probability of mor-
tality due to probable incineration activity. Various sites are selected to repre-
sent expected highest risk areas.
Source: OPPE Report, Number 4, Exhibit 8-5, p.178; for discussion of units see
OPPE Report, Number 4, Vol 2, Appendix D for land based systems; and Appen-
dix G for ocean based systems.
. 66 -
Stated verbally, the expected increased risk of dying due to the operation of a land based
hazardous waste incinerator ranges from 3. chances in 100,000 to one in one million.
Incremental risks due to ocean incineration range from one in one million to six in ten mil·
lion at the coast and less than two per 100 million at the port facility. The report goes on
to compare these results with the overall risk of air toxics in the country· given at four to
six chances in ten thousand. ' 0 4 Accordingly, the risk of incineration systems to the MEl
is three orders of magnitude lower than the overall risk to the general public of air toxics.
Three orders of magnitude (1000 fold) is a tremendous difference. Given that differ-
ence, it is surprising that the public opposition could not be calmed by the figure. This can
be explained by the differences in risk perception between the public and experts. The
model's final analysis does not incorporate the many factors which have been outlined as
important to the lay public. The model places more faith in the EPA than the public does,
for example, when it makes the statement:
Releases from land based incineration can also include scrubber wastes
containing substantial quantities of Cl and metals. Because the disposal of
scrubber sludge, brine and waste water are regulated by the EPA uncont-
rolled releases of these materials in hazardous form seems unlikely. t 0 5
Regulations, no matter how stringent, are not taken by the public at face value as being
adequate to protect health and environment.
A second assumption which is indicative of the model's optimistic risk picture relates
to the storing and loading of wastes for ocean incineration. The model assumes that
Chemical Waste Management's Emelle, Alabama facility would be replaced by a new inte-
grated storage facility at Chicksaw, Alabama. Through a sensitivity analysis, rerunning
the model under different numeric conditions, it is estimated that the Emelle facility would
1 04 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office Air and Radiation and OPPE, The
Magnitude and Nature of the Air Toxics Problem in the U.S.Draft Report, 1984 as
cited in OPPE op.cit.
'05 OPPE Report, Vol 4, op.cit., p. 6·12
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lead to 60% greater releases for the land transportation section, slightly more than double
the releases due to pump failures, and more than seven times greater fugitive emissions
than the Chicksaw facility. 1 0 6
There are three reasons that the assumption of a new storage/transfer station are
troubling. First, given the difficulty of permitting any hazardous waste facility, let alone
one associated with ocean incineration, it is quite possible that local political opposition
could stop the permitting at Chickasaw. In that case the relevant risk figures would be as
those for Emelle. Second, the release data generated for Chickasaw is entirely hypotheti-
cal. Empirical data from the facility may be quite different. The third reason is the most
significant but least obvious. The investment in a new, large scale facility explicitly for
ocean incineration would tend to favor the technology as a fairly long term solution to the
liquid hazardous waste problem. As established by the OPPE public opinion report the
public is concerned that ocean incineration not interfere with the development of less envi-
ronmentally threatening treatment methods or the phasing out of untreatable hazardous
materials.
The adequacy of the quantified risk assessment model to the lay public can be derived
even though there are no published comments. The model does not account for several
factors which lay persons find important. The assumptions necessary to produce results
for a quantified model run contrary to the lay person's concern over unknown risks.
Moreover, some of the assumptions about management or conditions are not acceptable to
the public. The single mortality number de-emphasizes distributional aspects of risk and
negates equity questions involving the voluntariness of risk. The ocean's perceived
"special value" is not explicitly dealt with. In conclusion, it can be said that lay persons
are as disinclined towards the quantified risk approach as expert assessors are of public
opinion surveys.
1 0 6 ibid., pp. 4·8
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The quantified risk assessment is a step forward from an expert risk assessment per-
spective. This quantified risk assessment model is the first attempt to quantify the risk of
ocean incineration in terms of mortality. If the results from this model are taken to the
next step in the process, the judgement of tolerability, we see that they can be most effi-
ciently used in risk cost benefit analysis. If one assigns a value to a human life, it
becomes a simple matter to utilize mortality statistics directly in a costlbenefit equation.
Even if one does not assign a dollar value to the life, the mortality figures can be used in a
comparative sense with other technologies for which such information is available. This
emphasis toward RCBA is evidenced in the broader OPPE report insofar as a complete
market analysis is included for land and ocean incineration. t 07
The overall strength of the OPPE report lies in the credible efforts to assess both
quantified risk and public opinion. For the first time EPA acknowledged the importance of
both expert and lay opinion and made a concerted effort to define each. It is also the first
time that the agency published a broad assessment of the technology rather than a report
specifically linked to an ocean incineration proposal.
It is significant that this report is both discretionary and reactive. There is no legis-
lation which forced the EPA to prepare the report, not NEPA, not MPRSA. The Agency
acted in response to the tremendous amount of public pressure applied at the various
hearings on specific incineration proposals. As such, the reports are a more direct
response from an agency than generally seen. Usually the public pressure is applied on
Congress which passes laws to direct the agency. In this case no laws, either on the use of
risk assessment or on ocean incineration, have been passed to date.
\ 07 EPA, Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation, Assessment of Incineration as a
Treatment Method for Liquid Organic Hazardous Wastes: Background Report III:
Assessment of the Commercial Hazardous Waste Incineration Market, 1985
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SAB Report
The EPA's Scientific Advisory Board report provides a unique point of contrast to the
OPPE report. Superficially, the reports are similar, given that they have the same trig-
ger. Administrator Ruckelshaus approached the board in 1983 asking for an analysis of
the human health and environmental effects of ocean incineration and a few months later
Deputy Administrator AIm expanded that request to include land based facilities. The
approach of the SAB and the resulting report are, however, somewhat different.
The differences can be explained in large part by the differences in the mission of the
group. The SAB was established by NEPA as a semi-autonomous group to give the EPA
technical scientific advice on complex issues at the request of the Administrator. 1 0 8 The
members of the SAB were to be independent of the agency and therefore more forthright.
The OPPE is closer to the management decisions of the Agency. The Office is responsible
for budgetary matters as well as more abstract policy.
The scope of the assessment performed by SAB is not unlike that used in the OPPE
report for the quantified risk assessment. The committee delineated five steps within the
incineration process which could yield releases to the environment and examined the rami-
fications of each. To this list they also added a separate analysis of the research needs for
proper incineration management.
The procedure, however, is quite different from the quantified risk model. Instead of
trying to quantify the probability and impact of releases at each step, the SAB analyzed
and criticized previous attempts at quantification. Possible sources of error were discussed
in considerable detaiL For example, several reasons were given to shift from a reliance on
Destruction Efficiency (DE) of the Principal Organic Hazardous Constituents (POHCs) at
optimal operational conditions as a measure of hazardous stack releases to a method which
would incorporate PICs and upset conditions. 1 0 9
'08 42 U.S.C. 4365
1 0 9 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Scientific Advisory Board, Report on the
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Many of the sources for this report were personal interviews with and correspondence
with and among EPA personnel. The SAB was also in communication with the OPPE
during the period in which it drafted its report. To a certain extent, the information gath-
ered by OPPE was in response to the criticism raised by the SAB. For example, the
quantified risk assessment model endeavors to assess the releases from fugitive emissions
from all phases of waste management for each technology. This is the first of 12 major
recommendations made by the SAB. The full extent to which the OPPE report and subse-
quent EPA action has fulfilled SAB's recommendations, while of interest and bearing to
this study is beyond its scope. The recommendations have complex implications for EPA's
administrative structure and the legislation which guides the management of hazardous
waste.
The SAB report's review process was not open to the extent that reports were not
circulated and commented on. Despite this, the analysis and recommendations respond to
many public and expert risk concerns. Many of the public's specific and broad manage-
ment related concerns were addressed in the report, including the reactive nature of agen-
cies and the problems created from managing programs with overlapping and unclear
bureaucratic oversight. Expert concerns for the quantification of releases and appropriate
baseline and monitoring information were also discussed. The key factor in creating a
report which satisfies both public and expert concerns seems to be the independent ad hoc
nature of the committee which generated the report.
SAB's report is the most management oriented of all the assessments. It assesses
EPA's assessment and management rather than directly assessing the technology. As
such it plays a specialized role in the development of ocean incineration assessment. The
final report reviewed here uses this specialized information and the detailed risk informa-
tion provided by OPPE, among other sources, to produce a broad risk assessment that
places weight on both public and expert risk perception.
Incineration of Liquid Hazardous Wastes, 1985 pp16-20
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OTA Report
The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) is a Congressional agency established by the
Technology Assessment Act of 1972. 1 10 OTA's purpose is to provide objective analysis
of major public policy issues related to scientific and technological change. OTA staff
works closely with congressional and agency staff to ensure that major concerns will be
addressed. Each project is overseen by a panel of experts from the field studied to ensure
objectivity.
In 1984, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment was requested to
perform a report on the role of oceans as a waste disposal medium by the House Commit-
tees on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and on Public Welfare and Transportation. The
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation also endorsed the study.
Later the House Science and Technology Committee requested a more full report specifi-
cally on ocean incineration. As such, this represents the third discretionary report pre-
pared in this period. The resultant publication was published in August 1986. 1 1 1
Procedurally, the OTA study is similar to SAB's report. An ad hoc committee of
experts was established to communicate with regulators, the industry and the public on
the relevant factors concerning the role of ocean incineration in hazardous waste manage-
ment. The report synthesizes the comments from these various groups and draws conclu-
sions and makes recommendations from them. As such, it has no formal outside review
process but, theoretically, incorporates outside comments directly into the report.
The OTA report differs from the SAB report, and all others reviewed, both in its scope
and presentation. This is the first report to assess the appropriateness of ocean incinera-
tion at a "comprehensive" as well as a technological level. 1 1 2 For example, this report
1 10 86 Stat 797; 2 USC 472
1 1 1 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Ocean Incineration: Its Role in
Managing Hazardous Waste, 1986
, , 2 See Figure 1
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questions the effect a full scale ocean incineration program would have on other emerging
technologies for liquid organic hazardous waste. The report also places ocean incineration
firmly within the context of hazardous waste management generally by referring to two
other OTA reports, the then as yet unpublished study of oceans as a waste space 1 1 3 and
Toward Serious Reduction in Hazardous Waste. 1 1" The discussion of policy also follows
this broad plan. Both the general management recommendations brought up in the Hear-
ing Officer's report and the technical recommendations of the SAB and OPPE are reiterat-
ed. Attention is also paid to the recommendations of the international community based on
the North Sea experience. Extant legislation governing aspects of ocean incineration is
laid out with various proposals about how it could be changed.
The OTA report, more than any other, goes beyond balancing risk perspectives· it
communicates them. The visual and written style present expert risk information in a
manner which is understandable to the lay public. For example, its concise and more
readable style contrast sharply with the OPPE report, even though the OPPE report is the
source for much of its information. Similarly, the style of the report conveys public risk
perception in a manner to be appreciated by risk experts. This report corrects two f1aws
which prevented maximum risk communication in previous reports. The OPPE reports
and the HOR reports dealt with public risk perception as a largely distinct issue, written
under separate cover. EIS's and the SAB report did not consciously identify and analyze
the lay perspective within the context of the larger assessment.
The differences between the OTA report and previous assessments follows from the
differences between legislative and administrative agencies. Congress as a legislative body
is less concerned with details than the EPA. Congress is also more directly accessible and
therefore accountable to both the lay public and experts and therefore has an incentive to
1 1 3 U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment, Wastes in the Marine Environ-
ment, 1987
1 '" U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Towards Serious Reduction in
Hazardous Wastes, 1986
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understand both perspectives. Moreover, the representatives themselves are not likely to
be as well versed in the issue as agency experts. Therefore, any report prepared to advise
them must be written in a clean, readable form.
The effect of the OTA's scope, organization and presentation should please both public
and expert risk assessors. From a lay person's perspective the report is desirable because
it includes discussion of specific and broad management issues which may effect risk and a
discussion on alternative technologies. The inclusion of OPPE's quantified risk assessment
main results would please expert risk assessors. Moreover, the report contains a thorough
discussion of waste streams, current disposal options, emerging technologies and incinera-
tor technology itself. This basic information, necessary to judge the relative importance of
ocean incineration - to weigh against risk in judging the tolerability of ocean incineration -
has been omitted in other reports.
Summary of Agency Balancing Period
In evaluating the incorporation of public vs. expert risk assessment for tht .' three reports,
as opposed to the four reports discussed during the viable option period, one is struck by
the similarity among the reports. Though they present information from slightly different
perspective . OPPE most technical, SAB most conscious of the relationship between
assessment and management, and OTA most concise and well written - all three reports
endeavor to balance public and expert risk perspectives.
This consistency can be explained by reiterating the similarity of the factors which
influence the balance for these reports. Each was prepared on a discretionary basis, using
an ad hoc committee removed from the direct management of ocean incineration. Each
report assessed the technology as a whole, and therefore was influenced by the same set of
relevant facts. Moreover, they were preparE;d almost concurrently, so the public mood
toward ocean incineration remained constant.
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Public opinion is given considerable weight in these reports. This is not surprising
given that discretionary requests for these reports were driven by the tremendous public
opposition voiced toward ocean incineration since the Brownsville hearing. The prepara-
tion of these assessments represents a more direct response to the public than is generally
seen from agencies· which normally act from legislative mandates.
The reports prepared during this balancing period are more removed from the man-
agement process than other reports. Unlike EIS's which are prepared and guided by
agencies with a specific proposal in mind, or reports which were generated in connection
with specific burn permits or the development of a regular ocean incineration program,
these reports were prepared by ad hoc committees not directly connected to the EPA's
office of Water which developed regulations. The assessment process has moved from
industry to agencies with regulatory capacity and finally to oversight agencies. From the
public's perspective this movement represents a formal acknowledgement of lay concerns.
Expert risk assessment also advanced during this period. A quantitative risk assess-
ment was used for the first time. This model generated numbers representing the proba-
ble increased human health risk to a theoretically most exposed individual due to ocean
incineration. Expressing the risk of ocean incineration as such, a probable mortality fig-
ure, allows for comparison with other mortality figures from other hazardous activities.
Mortality figures are also easily used as part of a Risk/Cost/Benefit Analysis. It was not-
ed that the risk of incineration to the Most Exposed Individual as determined by the model
is three orders of magnitude lower than the overall risk to the general public from existing
levels of toxic air pollutants.
This period of ocean incineration assessments can best be summarized by stating that
the assessments were more balanced and more weight was placed on both sides of that
balance. By increasing the weight of public opinion the agency could justify· as a success
- later actions to curtail its ocean incineration program because the overall assessment of
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the technology is more negative. Increasing the weight of expert opinion could serve to
justify the agencies' past action and to try to change public opinion. As has been dis-
cussed, however, the public does not use mortality figures as a primary measure of riski-
ness. It is, therefore, understandable that public opinion was not mollified.
Withdrawal from Ocean Incineration
The fourth, seemingly final, phase of the ocean incineration process has no reports pre-
pared by federal agencies. Ocean incineration has been extinguished, at least for the
moment. The defeat of ocean incineration in the U.S. was preceded by several actions. In
November 1985, At-Sea Inc. defaulted on $68 million in MARAD loans to build two incin-
erator ships. The Apollo I was 90% complete and Apollo II was 60% complete when the
company filed for bankruptcy. During the period when the technology was being reconsid-
ered by agencies four permits were tentatively issued and denied due to public opposition.
In May 1986, EPA decided not to grant any permits until it successfully issued rules on
ocean incineration. Then there was a long pause while the remaining companies waited
for EPA to promulgate final regulations. Chemical Waste Management Inc., owner of
Vulcanuses I and II, the only ships to operate in U.S. waters, sued the EPA to force the
agency to consider a permit pending on the regulations issuance. On September 16, 1987
the judge ruled that the EPA could defer a decision on the permit. 1 1 5
The defeat of ocean incineration followed precipitously. On December 23, 1987
Chemical Waste announced withdrawal of interest in the American market. 1 1 6 EPA
soon announced that it was examining eliminating the ocean incineration program ques-
tioning its need and whether adequate funding was available. 1 1 7 The only remaining
industry interest is by Sea Burn Inc., division of Stolt-Nielson Inc., but that is only a
1 15 Waste Management Inc. v EPA, DC DC, No.86-3356
, , 6 BNA Environmental Reporter 1-15-88, p.2015
, '7 ibid.
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"paper" proposal as the company has no ships, only plans. Moreover, Seaburn's interest
is also linked to a judicial attempt to force EPA to promulgate regulations. 1 1 8
EPA's withdrawal of its ocean incineration program represents a 180 degree shift in
the agency's attitude toward the technology. Recall that in 1973 when the agency was
approached by Shell Chemical to develop regulations on ocean incineration, the agency
stated that it had no authority to do so because the activity was not really harmful enough
to constitute ocean dumping. In refusing to promulgate final regulations under MPRSA,
the agency implied that it feels ocean incineration is too potentially harmful to be allowed
in U.S. waters.
, 1 8 Seaburn Inc. us. U.S. EPA filed March 9, 1988 DC, DC.
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Chapter VII
CONCLUSIONS
Ocean incineration's hazard assessment process has shown itself to be both varied subs-
tantively and subject to complex factors. Through the course of the 1.5 years of U.S. ocean
incineration history, agency assessments have generally concluded that the technology is a
sound and desirable treatment method, while the public has expressed grave reservations
about ocean incineration. The weight placed by the agencies on public and expert hazard
opinion has shifted.
It was hypothesized at the beginning of this study that these shifts were influenced by
the relative strength of public/environmental and private/industrial interest groups. This
general hypothesis was broken up into four subproofs to facilitate discussion. First, that a
correlation exists between hazard perspective and the interests of groups. Second, that the
balance of hazard perspectives by agencies is influenced by certain factors, including:
mandated review processes, the legislatively defined scope, the reactive nature of agencies,
and the agencies' distance from the management process. Third, that the change in bal-
ance over time corresponds to changes in the relative strength of the interest groups.
Finally, that agency actions were discretionary, and not forced by changes in the legal or
factual settings. The purpose is to examine how the political setting affects the process of
hazard assessment.
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Correlations Between Hazard Perspectives and Interest Groups
The manner in which agencies balanced expert and public hazard opinion within the indi-
vidual reports was influenced by the relative involvement and strength of opposing interest
groups at the time. It was hypothesized that the hazard opinion of the participating public
and environmental groups in the ocean incineration controversy would resemble that pre-
dicted by research into expressed preferences of general risks by the lay public. Further,
it was hypothesized that industry would try and couch the argument of ocean incineration
in a manner similar to risk experts. In the next two sections it will be demonstrated that
these correlations exist empirically.
Public Hazard Assessment
Reviewing the hazard assessment reports has shown us that the portion of the lay public
which was vocal in the ocean incineration controversy was indeed concerned with social
values as predicted from Expressed Preference research. The public is concerned with the
"dread" risk of ocean incineration as evidenced by the public's preoccupation with the risk
of a catastrophic spill· an accident which would release hazardous material into a fertile
estuary. Simifarly, the public worries about several "unknown" aspects of the technology,
the quantity and effect of PIC's, and the effect of pollutants on the surface microlayer, and
the cumulative impact of ocean incineration pollutants and other pollutants at sea.
The case study of ocean incineration has, however, expanded the risk characteristics
important to the lay public from those predicted in theoretical Expressed Preferences
research. 1 1 9
• Conventional risks, those modeled by risk experts, do play a role in the public's
overall risk determination. The public and experts were concerned about the human
health impacts from routine spills and air emissions. The substantive emphasis of
the public on conventional risks is, however, limited. This is evidenced by the mini-
1 1 9 See Table 2
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mal impact made on the public by OPPE's quantified risk assessment model. Public
opposition was not swayed by finding that the risk of incineration systems to the
MEl is three orders of magnitude less than the overall risk posed by toxic air pollu-
tion.
• Management issues are evaluated by the public at several levels - from company
credibility and emergency response routines to the importance of a national hazard-
ous waste management strategy. Moreover, the public was concerned that risks be
distributed and minimized across the country. EPA's perceived poor management of
its ocean incineration regulatory program figured high in the list of risk concerns.
• Geographic specialness of the oceans as a unique natural resource also contributed to
the public's risk perception of ocean incineration.
Of all the risk characteristics used by the public, the importance of risk management
to the public is most significant to the hypothesis that political considerations influence
agency assessments. As established in the section on hazard assessment theory, the
management of environmental hazards is inherently political. The linking of assessment
and management in the public's mind supports the statement that the assessment process
is also political.
IndustryiExpert Hazard Assessment
Risk experts and industry proponents were hypothesized to use quantifiable asocial risk
information. The examination of agency hazard assessment reports has shown that the
reports with the least consideration of social factors and the most quantification have
indeed tended to side with proponents of ocean incineration.
Let us first re-examine the correlation between reports that do not consider social fac-
tors and those which are pro-ocean incineration. Chapter 4 concluded that during the via-
ble option period there was a direct correlation between the extent the reports omitted
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social factors and the overall industry advocacy position of the report. The reports which
followed also correlate directly. The public opinion reports, which are extensively weighted
toward social concerns, are the least favorable to ocean incineration. The quantified risk
assessment study performed by OPPE did not model social factors in any systematic way
and also came to a pro-industry conclusion. The three reports prepared during the recon-
sideration of ocean incineration: OTA, EPA's SAB, and the overall OPPE report· while
they considered many social factors, did not come up with a strongly negative posicion.
This is in part because the quantified expert risk information counterbalanced the public
risk perspective.
The correlation between industry and expert risk perspectives with respect to the
quality of quantified information was hypothesized to be limited. Industrial proponents are
interested in supplying adequate information to provide decisions to be made according to
ReBA or Natural Baseline methods. The data which has been gathered on: the combus-
tion efficiency, concentration of pollutants in the environment, possible human health or
biological harm due to those pollutants and the probability and impact of spills; have
largely supported industry claims of the relative safety of the technology.
Industry evaluation, however, did differ from the perspective of academic risk experts
in the acceptable quality of the research as measured by:
• the extent of quantification
• the relevance of the information
• the thoroughness of the substantiation
Disagreement existed between risk experts and ocean incineration proponents on the
extent of quantification in the MARAD EIS. MARAD, acting as an industry advocate in
its position to grant vessel loans, disregarded comments from outside risk experts at NSF
to create a risk probability matrix including the risk of spills, to evaluate the proposal
which would allow for ordinal comparison of risk data. Irrelevant risk data on the lack of
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impact that ocean incineration would have on stratospheric ozone and regional acid rain
was prepared by industry for incorporation into EPA's FEIS for the Gulf of Mexico. Poor-
ly substantiated industry information was presented in the Shell Burn report where only
one industry source was used as evidence that ocean incineration would not have an
impact on migratory birds. Throughout the viable option period there is evidence that the
agency was inclined toward the industry position insofar as reports included risk informa-
tion as above. The reports reflect industry rather than expert risk perspectives in these
cases.
The correlation between hazard perspectives and interest groups has been established
and refined. The public which became involved with ocean incineration has used risk fac-
tors as predicted from expressed preferences research in addition to other social factors.
Industry proponents have used quantified risk data to argue in favor of ocean incineration.
The range of threats considered by industry and experts has also been narrower than
those considered by the public. The differences between the public and expert risk percep-
tion have been shown to be great both in theory and for an actual case study.
Factors Influencing the Balance Between the Public and Experts
For each hazard assessment report the balance between expert and public risk opinion
made by the agencies was discussed in the text. Four significant observations were noted
on the factual, legal, administr'ative and political factors which influence the balancing
process.
1. The mandated review process has a substantive effect on the incorporation of
public vs. expert opinion.
2. The legislative framework for an assessment influences the balance of public and
expert opinion by partially determining the scope of hazards to be considered.
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3. Agencies balance hazard perspectives in a reactive manner - they are dependent
on the involvement of interest groups.
4. Agencies with significant management responsibilities tend to produce less bal-
anced reports than those which are removed from managing the technology.
The implications of these statements provide proof that agencies are influenced by political
pressure during the risk assessment process.
Mandatory Review Processes
The mandatory review processes for ocean incineration are dictated by NEPA and the
MPRSA as interpreted by the courts. NEPA requires that: draft EIS's be circulated to a
select group of individuals including those from public interest groups; that the agency hold
open meetings where oral statements can be made and that written comments be accepted
and responded to in the FEIS. Comparison of the three EISs prepared during the viable
option period with the Shell test burn report has shown that the NEPA review process has
substantive positive effect on the incorporation of lay public opinion - when expressed.
NEPA was shown to have less of an effect on the incorporation of expert opinion. There is
no legislative requirement which forces the use of quantified information.
The effect of the mandatory review requirements of the MPRSA is less pervasive but
also significant. Note here that this study has limited itself to the review requirements of
the assessment process and does not deal with the review requirements of proposed or
promulgated regulations. The interesting review requirement for our purposes is that of
the Hearing Officer's report. The MPRSA legislates that an EPA officer compile public
concerns and make recommendation from the hearings held on pending ocean incineration
permits and make the report available to those who request it. Analysis of a sample
report has shown it to be the most heavily weighed toward public opinion of all of the
reports.
. 83 .
Legislatively Defined Scope
As with the mandated review processes, the two major pieces of legislation triggering
agency ocean incineration hazard assessments playa significant role in defining the scope,
and hence, in determining the balance. NEPA confines discussion of the potential hazards
to the technological choice level as described by Hohonemser in Figure 1. Moreover, EIS's
deal with specific proposals - often limiting discussion of infrastructural impacts. Public
opinion is inclined to desire a broader consideration of risks whereas experts often focus on
a more narrow interpretation of a hazard's cause. Therefore, within the context of an EIS
it is difficult to fully account for concerns of either the public or the experts.
The MPRSA and associated regulations have similarly defined the scope of hazards to
be considered by agencies and thereby affected the balance. Notably, the three sets of
general ocean dumping criteria cast considerable weight on economic factors in the deter-
mination of ocean incineration's acceptability. These criteria were not developed for ocean
incineration and differed from the types of concerns raised by the public in hearings and
interviews. Beyond weighing economic factors, the sets of criteria also emphasized factors
for use in Natural Baseline risk determination.
Reactive Nature of Agencies
While agencies are under legal obligation to perform certain procedural reviews, as
described above, the substantive impact of the review process has been shown to be
dependent on the involvement of the relevant interest groups. Neither the legislation nor
court interpretation requires that the Agencies search out and pro-actively balance public
and expert risk concerns. Rather, as is evidenced by different balances under the same
legislative trigger, the weight is affected by the amount of public and industry involve-
ment. Initially, public opposition was not well organized - the MARAD EIS, for example,
was not commented on by any environmental group and minimal comments were made by
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coastal states. The MARAD FEIS reflects the least concern with public opinion of all the
EISs.
Agency Distance from Management Process
There is a direct correlation between an agency's distance from interest in the outcome of
ocean incineration and the quality of the balance of expert and public opinion within the
report. Quality is defined here as placing equal and considerable weight on both public and
expert perspectives.
This is an important observation and one that requires considerable comment. Agen-
cies with a direct stake in the management outcome of the technology produce biased
reports in favor of the technology and do not give adequate weight to public concerns. The
MARAD report is the best example of this phenomena. Once the decision had been made
internally to loan At-Sea Incineration $64 million, MARAD was intimately involved with
the success of ocean incineration. The failure of the technology and consequent bankruptcy
and default on the loan would, and did, reflect poorly on MARAD.l 20 The Agency's
interest in promoting the technology is reflected in the report which devalues public con-
cerns.
The other end of the spectrum, agencies without a predetermined management inter-
est in the technology, is occupied by the Air Force and OTA. The Air Force's primary
motive as owners of stockpiles of Agent Orange, was in finding the best, safest, and
cheapest disposal method. They did not know much about any specific technology before
beginning the search, nor did they have an administrative reason to consider ocean incin-
eration above any other technology. The Air Force report was particularly noted among
all of the reports prepared during the viable option period for considering both expert and
public hazard perspectives in depth.
1 20 Howard Kurtz and Michael Iskoff, "The Sinking of $64 Million: Taxpayers Lose as
Incinerator Ship Loans Founder.", Washington Post Weekly Editi.on, December 9,
1985, p33.
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OTA was designed to be removed from the management process. It is responsible to
Congress and not to an administrative management agency. Moreover, because each
report is written by a different ad hoc group of specialists in the particular field, no long
term tie can develop between the assessors and the managers. Again, as with the Air
Force report, this report was noted as the most balanced among the three contemporary
reports.
EPA's stake in the outcome of ocean incineration lies somewhere between these two
points. EPA's general mission is to manage environmental hazards and specifically to
enforce the MPRSA. As a manager the Agency is responsible to institute the programs
which it feels - as a risk expert - are least harmful to the environment. Yet the Agency is
also responsible to manage hazards according to public opinion. This dual role for EPA is
reflected in the range of balances achieved by various departments within the Agency.
The Office of Water and Hazardous Substances, which is directly concerned with the pro-
mulgation of ocean incineration regulations, produced the Shell Burn Report and the Gulf
of Mexico FEIS, both of which were more weighted toward expert rather than public opin-
ion. OPPE and SAB, which are not directly involved with regulatory matters prepared
more balanced assessments.
This observation, that an agency's management role has a substantive effect on the
outcome of an assessment provides yet another link between hazard assessment and haz-
ard management. As shown in the theoretical section, the environmental hazard manage-
ment process is inherently political. The closer the bureaucratic link between these two
processes, the greater the opportunity for the assessment itself to become politicized.
In summary, We have seen that the agency balance of ex.pert and public opinion is
affected by several legallbureaucratic factors. Agencies operate within a legal framework
which affects the assessment process by defining the review process and scope of threats
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to be considered. Within the same legal framework an agency may vary the amount of
weight placed on public or expert risk opinion dependent on the amount of outside involve-
ment of interest groups. The review processes are established to make agencies react to
expressed opinion rather than for agencies to shape opinion. Finally, various agencies
may weigh a technology differently dependent upon how intimately involved the agency is
with the management of the technology. Where an agency has a stake in seeing the tech-
nology succeed, public concerns tend to be devalued.
Changes in Balance Over Time
The history of ocean incineration in the U.S. can be divided into four temporal phases -
viable option, public opposition, reconsideration and withdrawal. These phases which are
somewhat overlapping can be distinguished by the differences in public mood toward ocean
incineration at the time, and differences in assessments prepared by federal agencies.
There is a strong correlation between the relative political strength of the ocean incinera-
tion interest groups and the consideration of their respective hazard perception within the
agency reports. The reports present subtle changes in the scope of hazards and types of
information gathered over the entire assessment period. This progression is reflective of
increased public involvement and concern.
Viable Option
With the passage of the MPRSA in 1972, direct ocean dumping of liquid hazardous wastes
was prohibited. Industries which had previously dumped these wastes at sea were forced
to find a new treatment method and consequently ocean incineration became a viable
option. Industry presented proposals to EPA and tried to establish this new means to
solve their waste disposal dilemma. Meanwhile the public had yet to become involved with
the issue of ocean incineration. Neither issue specific, well organized local organizations,
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nor general national environmental organizations had taken up the cause during this
phase. State governments, off whose coasts the wastes would be burned and through
whose ports the waste would be transported did not initially object to the technology, even
though they were contacted during the EIS process for the Gulf of Mexico site designation.
The federal government's response to this lopsided initial involvement is apparent in
the hazard assessment reports. Concerns which the public would later come to express
were for the most part not dealt with in these reports. The scope of hazards of ocean
incineration were limited to: specific proposals, normal operating conditions, emissions and
routine spills. Impacts of concern were: human health considerations and damage to the
marine environment - particularly economic damage to fisheries or beaches. When the
environmental hazards were evaluated in this way, the technology appeared to be particu-
larly promising.
Management action taken on the part of federal agencies was based on the assump-
tion that the technology was viable. EPA allowed Shell Chemical to burn 8400 tons of
waste during the determination of the technology's safety. MARAD granted a $64million
loan for the construction of two ocean incineration vessels. The Air Force burned 2.3 mil-
lion gallons of stockpiled Agent Orange. Moreover, EPA permitted four other commercial
sized burns on a research basis and began to establish ocean incineration as a routinely
permitted activity.
Public Opposition
Just as the first phase of ocean incineration's history can be characterized by federal
agency reaction to industry action, the second phase can be characterized by public reac-
tion to agency action. Quite rapidly, and without a single clearly identifiable reason, public
opposition to ocean incineration became apparent. It is, however, clear that the public only
became involved after industry and agencies had made an initial acceptance of the tech-
nology and acted accordingly.
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The reports prepared and examined during this phase try to characterize public oppo-
sition. The scope of risks considered by the public was found to be broad with substantial
emphasis on the impact of management and the special value of the oceans as a natural
resource. Public hearing records and personal interviews of public ocean incineration
opponents were compiled d~ring this period to fully understand the socially perceived haz·
ard presented by ocean incineration.
Public opposition to ocean incineration began to affect management decision toward
the technology during this period. Delays began both on pending permits, proposed regu-
lations and formal assessments.
Reconsidering Ocean Incineration
The third phase of ocean incineration differentiates itself from the second, because during
this period agencies actively internalized the concerns of the public within their assess-
ments. Public opposition had not diminished. The three reports from this period strongly
incorporated both expert and public risk perspectives. The reports treat ocean incineration
broadly as a treatment method of hazardous waste and discuss a wide range of alterna-
tives. Management issues are raised. On the other hand expert risk evaluation was also
advanced - particularly through the use of quantified risk assessment model.
Notably, the reports during this phase were not prepared by agencies with a direct
managerial role for ocean incineration but rather on a discretionary basis by oversight
agencies. This shift in the assessments away from the more technical branches of EPA
toward the policy branches of EPA and the technical branches of Congress had a substan-
tive impact on the process and outcome of the assessments. Assessments by these bodies
incorporate more social factors in keeping with the authoring agency's general goals.
The technical branches of EPA remained in a holding pattern while waiting for the
oversight agencies to resolve the ocean incineration controversy. Inaction continued on
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permits and final regulations for routine incineration permits were not promulgated.
Industry turned to the courts to try, ultimately unsuccessfully, to force action. EPA's
action on ocean incineration was blocked by political pressure mounted by public opposi-
tion. EPA could not, however, cave in to public pressure entirely because according to its
own expert technical assessments, ocean incineration was still a viable option. Therefore,
the agency waited until one of the major external interest groups shifted position.
Withdrawal
Delay in the promulgation of regulations, the refusal of EPA to grant permits before pro-
mulgating regulations, and a court decision supporting agency inaction, finally caused the
major industrial proponent of ocean incineration to withdraw from the U.S. market in
December 1987. EPA then formally withdrew from further plans on an ocean incineration
program citing a lack of industry interest. This was a management action on the agency's
part and was not accompanied by any formal hazard assessment report.
The final withdrawal of ocean incineration as a viable treatment option for liquid haz-
ardous wastes allows one to make observations on the pattern of the assessment process
as a whole - rather than at a micro-leve~ through individual reports. Initially, in response
to heightened levels of risk intolerability expressed by outlawing direct ocean dumping,
industry was the first to become involved in the assessment process. The lay public was
unaware and unconcerned about the technology. Agencies proceeded to consider ocean
incineration as a viable option based on expert risk information. Increased public opposi-
tion brought about a broadened discussion of hazards considered and a formal acknowl-
edgement of social concerns.
Two trends are particularly significant over the history of ocean incineration which
demonstrate the political nature of the assessment process. First, we have seen agencies
increasingly incorporate social concerns as the public opposition to the technology grew.
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Second, we have seen the assessment process move further away from the managerial
agencies as public objections increased.
Changes in Balance. Discretionary
The changes in balance of expert and public risk perception seen in Agency assessments
over the course of the U.S. history of ocean incineration have been discretionary. These
changes are not a response to the other branches of government. The legal framework
triggering assessments has not changed. Neither has the factual setting surrounding
ocean incineration changed significantly.
The two laws governing the ocean incineration assessment process have not been
changed by Congress or Court interpretation. NEPA, which serves as the legal require-
ment, or "trigger", for many of the assessments has not been radically amended since its
passage. Similarly, the relevant passages of the MPRSA have remained intact. Congress,
though it has held hearings on the issue 1 2 1 has not passed any legislation dealing specif-
ically with ocean incineration. Court interpretation of these laws has only affected the
assessment process insofar as it has generally upheld the discretionary rights of agen-
cies.' 2 2
The facts surrounding the environmental impacts caused by ocean incineration of
hazardous wastes have not altered the potential threat from the technology. The results
on emissions from each of the test burns have remained relatively constant. 1 2 3 There
have not been any major spills nor other other catastrophic events which would lead one to
empirically question the safety of the technology.
1 2 1 See for example U.S. Congress House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee,
Hearing on Incineration of Hazardous Wastes at Sea, 1985
1 2 2 .See discussion, p. 32
, 2 3 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Ocean Incineration: Its Role in
Managing Hazardous Waste, 1986 p. 100
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Where Are We Now?
By defeating ocean incineration the lay public won acknowledgement by EPA and the
industry of the importance of perceived risk in environmental policy. The public won a
sense of accomplishment for standing up to, and defeating, industry. The public won
acceptance of the idea that the oceans are an ecosystem of unique value. Certain individ-
uals, those who live closest to potencial storage and loading facilities, the MEls, probably
decreased their cancer risk due to exposure to the wastes. The public perceived that it
pushed back the limits of acceptable risks.
The public did not win a decrease in overall hazard. Removal of ocean incineration as
a choice for the disposal of liquid hazardous wastes reinforces use of current methods
including: underground injection wells, land-based incinerators, and "midnight dumping".
It also encourages the newer, unacceptable alternative of exportation to third world
nations. The public has stymied technological development in the hazardous waste treat·
ment field. The scrutiny and opposition to ocean incineration - a proposal to reduce waste .
has been greater than the scrutiny of the hazardous materials/waste production processes
themselves.
Risk experts did not win anything by the defeat of ocean incineration. The various
studies performed, from emissions monitoring to quantified risk models, which showed
ocean incineration as the preferred, currently available treatment method for certain liquid
hazardous wastes, were overruled. Experts did not communicate risk information to the
public in a form to lessen concern substantially.
The inability of agencies to inform society about risks in such a way that decisions can
be made to reduce the overall threat created by a technological activity is a fundamental
problem in environmental hazard assessment. The political nature of environmental haz-
ard assessment, as shown here both in theory and in a case study, complicates the situ-
ation. Solutions to alleviate this stalemate can only be effective if they are politically
practical.
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AFSAB
APA
BNA
CEQ
CFR
DE
EDC
EIS
EO
EPA
FEIS
FR
MARAD
MEl
MPRSA
NEPA
NSF
OPPE
OTA
PCB
PIC
PL
POHC
RCBA
RCRA
SAB
Appendix A
ABBREVIATIONS
Air Force Scientific Advisory Board
Administrative Procedures Act
Bureau of National Affairs
Council on Environmental Quality
Code of Federal Regulations
Destruction Efficiency
Ethylene dichloride
Environmental impact statement
Executive Order
Environmental Protection Agency
Final Environmental Impact Statement
Federal Register
Maritime Administration
Most Exposed Individual
Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act
National Environmental Policy Act
National Science Foundation
EPA's Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation
Office of Technology Assessment
Polychlorinated biphenyl
Product of Incomplete Combustion
Public Law
Principle Organic Hazardous Constituents
Risk/Cost/Benefit Analysis
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Scientific Advisory Board
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Appendix B
CRITERIA FOR SITE DESIGNATION
40 CFR § 228.5 General Criteria
(A) The dumping of materials into the ocean will be permitted only at sites or in are-
as selected to minimize the interference of disposal activities with other activities
in the marine environment, particularly avoiding areas of existing fisheries or
shellfisheries, and regions of heavy commercial or recreational navigation.
(B) Locations and boundaries of disposal sites will be so chosen the temporary per-
turbations in water quality or other environmental conditions caused by disposal
operations affecting mixing zones anywhere within the site can be expected to be
reduced to normal ambient seawater levels or to undetectable contaminant con-
centration or effects before reaching any beach, shoreline, marine sanctuary, or
known geographically limited fishery or shellfishery.
(e) If at any time during or after disposal site evaluation studies, it is determined
that existing disposal sites presently approved on an interim basis for ocean
dumping do not meet the criteria for site selection set forth in Sections
228..5-228.6. the use of such sites will be terminated as soon as suitable alternate
disposal sites can be designated.
(D'l The sizes of ocean disposal sites will be limited in order to localize for identifica-
tion and control any immediate adverse impacts and permit the implementation
of effective monitoring and surveillance programs to prevent adverse long-range
impacts. The size, configuration, and location of any disposal site will be deter-
mined as a part of the disposal site evaluation or designation study.
(E) EPA will, wherever feasible, designate ocean dumping sites beyond the edge of
the continental shelf.
40 CFR § 228.6 Specific Criteria
(Ai In the selection of disposal sites, in addition to other necessary or appropriate
factors determined by the Administrator, the following factors will be considered
(1) Geographical position, depth of water bottom topography and distance
from coast;
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(2) Location in relation to breeding, spawning, nursery, feeding or passage
areas of living resources in adult or juvenile phases;
(3) Location in relation to beaches or other amenity areas;
(4) Types and quantities of waste proposed to be disposed of and proposed
methods of release, including methods of packing the waste, if any;
(5) Feasibility of surveillance monitoring;
(6) Disposal, horizontal transportation and vertical mixing characteristics of
the ocean, including prevailing current direction and velocity. if any;
(7) Existence and effects of current and previous discharges and dumping in
the area (including cummulative effects);ulat
(8) Interference with shipping, fishing, recreation, mineral extraction. des-
alinization, fish and shellfish culture, areas of special scientific impor-
tance and other legitimate uses of the ocean;
(9) The existing water quality and ecology of the site as determined by
available data or by trend assessment or baseline surveys as described
in Guidelines for Ocean Disposal Site Baseline and Trend Assessment
Surveys;
(10) Potentiality for the development or recruitment of nuisance species In
the disposal site.
(11) Existence at or near the site of any significant natural or cultural fea-
tures of historical importance.
(B) The results of a disposal site evaluation and/or designation study based on the
criteria stated in paragraphs (1) - (11) will be presented in support of the site
designation promulgation as an environmental assessment of the impact of the
use of the site for disposal, and will be used in the preparation of an environmen-
tal impact statement for each site where such a statement is required by the
National Environmental Policy Act or EPA policy. By publication of a notice, an
environmental impact statement, in draft form, will be made available for public
comment not later than the time of publication of the site designation as proposed
rulemaking, and a final EIS will be made available at the time of final rulemak-
ing.
40 CFR §228.10 Evaluating Disposal Impact
(c) Determination of Severity of Effect
Impact Category I: The effects of activities at the disposal site shall be categorized
in Impact Category I when one or more of the following conditions is present.
There is identifiable progressive movement or accumulation, in detecta-
ble concentrations above ambient values, of any waste or waste constit-
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uent form the disposal site within 12 nautical miles of any shoreline,
marine sanctuary designated under Title III of the Act, or critical area
designated under Section 102(c) of the Act; or
(i) The biota, sediments, or water column of the disposal site, or
any area outside the disposal site where any waste or waste
constituent from the disposal site is present in detectable con-
centration above normal ambient values, are adversely affected
to the extent that there are statistically significant decreases in
the populations of valuable commercial or recreational species,
or of specific species of biota essential to the propagation os
such species, within the disposal site and such other area as
compared to populations of the same organisms in comparable
locations Qutside such site and are; or
(ii) Solid waste material disposed of at the site has accumulated at
the site or in areas adjacent to it, to such an extent that major
uses of the site or of adjacent areas are significantly impaired
and the Federal or State agency responsible for regulating such
uses certifies that such significant impairment has occurred
and states in its certificate the basis for its determination of
such impairment; or
(iii) There are adverse effects on the taste or odor of valuable com-
mercial or recreational species as a result of disposal activities;
or
(iv) When any toxic waste, toxic waste constituent, or toxic by-
product of waste interaction, is identified in toxic concentrations
above normal ambient values outside the disposal site more
than four hours after disposal.
(1) Impact Category II: The effects of activities at the disposal site which are
not categorized in Impact Category I shall be categorized in Impact Cat-
egory II.
Source: 40 CFR 228; 33 USC §1412 - 1418; 42 FR 2482, January 11 1977. As
cited in 40 CFR §228.6(a) as cited in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Office of Water and Hazardous Materials, Final Environmental Impact Statement
of Designation of a Site in the Gulf of Mexico for Incineration of Chemical
Wastes, 1976 , pp19-20
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